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PREFACE
In recent years, economists have paid increasing attention to 
property rights and their implications for economic behaviour. Given the 
market-oriented approach of neoclassical theory, it is not surprising 
that the term 'property' has usually been equated with 'private 
property'. The archetypal private property right, costlessly enforced and 
freely tradeable, has been set up as an ideal against which other forms 
of property rights may be measured.
fahile this approach has led to some important insights, it has had 
unfortunate consequences for the analysis of common property. The term 
has frequently been used to apply to a situation of open access, where no 
property rights of any kind exist. This has led to major analytical 
errors when economists have been confronted with actual and historical 
common property situations. Even when these errors have been avoided, 
there has been a general presumption that common property institutions 
are an inefficient substitute for genuine private property rights.
A particularly important area where a private property rights 
paradigm has been widely applied (and misapplied) has been the class of 
environmental problems usually referred to as 'externalities'. The object 
of this thesis will be to develop an analysis of these problems based on 
the concept of common property. It is argued that many of the analytical 
difficulties which have arisen with previous approaches to these problems 
have been the result of common property aspects of the situation, which 
these approaches have tended to obscure.
Chapter 1 describes the common property approach and highlights its 
divergences from the private property rights paradigm. Common property is 
considered, both as an institutional framework and as a conceptual tool 
of analysis. Some of the difficulties involved in the analysis of 
property rights structures solely in terms of private property rights are 
examined, with particular reference to externality problems. A topic of 
major interest is the conflict between the need for security in 
individual property rights and the need for flexibility in the overall 
property rights structure. It is argued that these needs may be 
reconciled in a common property framework. As well as being used in the
description of property rights structures, the concept of common property 
may be used as the basis for a formal analysis of resource usage 
problems, particularly those involving externalities. The central concept 
in this analysis is that of the value of a common property asset to a 
group of users, whose actions collectively determine the level of asset 
quality.
Chapter 2 examines, from a common property perspective, alternative 
approaches which have been taken to the economic analysis of 
environmental problems. The approaches considered are the Pigouvian 
externality analysis, Coase’s private property rights approach, the 
Mohring/Boyd asset utilisation framework and the theory of clubs. The 
chapter provides a general critique and also contains an analysis of some 
important applications of these approaches. Difficulties arising with 
these applications are shown to result from inadequacies in the paradigms 
on which they are based. For example, Baumöl and Oates’ (1975) attempt to 
draw a distinction between ’depletable' and 'undepletable' externalities 
is examined, and their conclusions shown to be untenable. The Pigouvian 
analysis of the issue of compensation for victims of detrimental 
externalities is also criticised. It is shown that non-distorting 
compensation can be paid to the victims of such externalities on the 
basis of the reduction in value of a common property asset. The Coasian 
analysis is criticised mainly for its treatment of externality problems 
in terms of private ’activity’ rights, rather than common property rights 
over assets. This criticism is backed by a re-examination of some cases 
in the law of nuisance, originally cited by Coase (1960).
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of institutions and pricing rules for 
’externality’ situations. First, the analytical concepts of the common 
property approach, developed in Chapter 1, are used to derive optimal 
pricing rules. Then the actual pricing rules likely to develop under 
common and private property institutions are considered, and compared to 
the optimal policies. In particular, conditions under which private 
ownership of assets will yield a Pareto-optimal pattern of resource use 
are derived and discussed.
Chapter 4 gives some applications of the common property approach. 
These are an analysis of the open field system of common property, which 
prevailed in medieval Europe, two aspects of salinity problems in 
agriculture, and a discussion of the economics of invention, patenting 
and Plant Variety Rights.
The discussion thus covers a very broad range of topics. This has had 
the effect that many topics are examined in less detail than they might 
merit in the absence of limitations on time and space. Such an approach 
is necessitated by the nature of the concept of common property which is 
advocated here, and by the wide range of analytical and methodological 
frameworks which have been applied to problems involving common property. 
Thus, whereas the theory of clubs has generally been placed in a separate 
compartment from the schools of Pigou and Coase, it has been necessary to 
consider all three approaches here. Indeed, it would be easy to add to 
the list with relevant bodies of literature, such as those concerned with 
the pricing of public goods and with Tiebout's (1956) concept of local 
public goods. However, a detailed analysis of these interesting, but 
peripheral, topics would take up too much space to be justified in the 
present thesis.
A similar compromise has been made in the selection of applications 
presented in Chapter 4. All of these applications are related to 
agriculture, reflecting the professional affiliations of the author. A 
range of examples, reflecting different facets of the common property 
approach, has been selected in preference to a detailed empirical 
analysis of a single problem. However, this range could easily have been 
extended to include other examples, such as multiple-use forestry land, 
and strata titles in real estate.
The ideas presented here have been developed over a significant 
period of time, and the discussion may in some places reflect what Keynes 
(1936, p vii) called the 'struggle of escape from habitual modes of 
thought and expression'. I believe that economists' 'habitual modes of 
thought and expression' regarding the concept of common property have 
been constricting and misleading, and that the struggle to escape them 
has been both necessary and worthwhile.
Chapter 1
THE COMMON PROPERTY APPROACH
1.1 Introduction
The phenomena usually described as externalities play a major role in 
a number of areas of economic analysis. The most notable of these is 
environmental economics, but externalities are also significant in areas 
such as agriculture, health, and transport economics. When the related 
area of public goods is taken into account, the importance of these 
phenomena, and of the analytical and policy problems they raise, may be 
seen to be very great.
It is, perhaps, not surprising then, that a number of different 
approaches have been used to analyse these problems. These approaches 
differ radically both in the tools of analysis they employ, and in the 
policy proposals they yield. Indeed, the differences are so great that a 
number of the approaches may be regarded, not merely as alternative 
theories, but as competing paradigms in the sense of Kuhn (1970).
The first of these analyses to emerge was that based on the concept 
of 'externality', put forward by Pigou (1924). The central idea was that 
problems of market failure arise when some of the costs of production or 
consumption are not borne by the relevant producer or consumer, but are 
imposed on some other individual.^ The standard example, and one of the 
most important in practice, is that of the damage done by smoke from 
factories. An example of a consumption externality is given by the 
discomfort and health damage suffered by non-smokers sharing confined 
spaces with smokers.
The Pigo vian analysis treats externalities as divergences between 
private and social marginal costs. It yields the policy recommendation 
that a tax which equalises the two should be imposed on the generator of
 ^More rarely, there may be positive externalities, in which other 
individuals benefit from the production or consumption activity which is 
undertaken).
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the externality. In this way, the usual optimality properties for a 
competitive economy can be restored.
The most prominent critique of the Pigo vian position is that 
developed by Coase (1960), who advanced an alternative analysis based on 
the concepts of 'property rights' and 'transactions costs'. Coase 
observed that rights to generate externalities were legally limited by 
the laws of nuisance and other torts. Thus, he argued, for any possible 
externality, two possible regimes could be distinguished - 'polluters 
rights' in which the externality may be legally generated and 'victims 
rights' in which the victim may prevent this (say, by injunction), or at 
least obtain compensation for damages. In the absence of transactions 
costs, it would make no difference to resource allocation which regime 
applied. Bargaining among the parties, perhaps involving 'side-payments' 
or 'bribes', would lead to an optimal allocation. However, Coase argued, 
if transaction costs prevented this happy outcome from occurring, it 
could not be stated a priori that either 'polluters rights' or 'victims 
rights' was a preferable regime. In particular, he rejected the Pigo vian 
claim that polluters should always pay taxes equal to the (marginal) 
damages they cause. Rather, the choice between the two regimes should 
depend on which would promote efficiency in any particular case. After 
examining a number of English and American tort cases, Coase suggested 
that the allocation of property rights by courts was roughly in 
accordance with the dictates of efficiency.
A third approach to the problem arose out of the 'increasing cost' 
controversy between Pigou and Knight (1924). Pigou interpreted increasing 
cost industries in terms of negative externalities among the producers 
(an example was a congested road), and argued that such industries would 
expand more than was socially desirable. Knight refuted Pigou's argument, 
pointing out that his example was based on the use of a fixed asset, the 
road, for which there was no charge.
Mohring and Boyd (1971) sought to develop and extend the Knightian 
'asset utilisation' approach to externality problems. They contrasted 
this approach with that of Pigou which they said was based on 'direct 
interaction' between individuals, a concept alien to an economic theory 
based on the price mechanism. More surprisingly, perhaps, they classed
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the Coasian property rights analysis as a direct interaction approach. 
Their argument was that the rights Coase described were general rights to 
undertake particular actions rather than property rights over specific 
assets. Mohring and Boyd argued that 'externality' problems can be 
analysed in terms of specific assets, and that the adoption of 
'competitive' pricing principles for such assets would yield an optimal 
allocation of resources.
Each of these approaches will be discussed in greater detail below. 
For the present, it is sufficient to note that none of them has proved 
completely satisfactory. In this thesis a new approach is introduced, 
based on the concept of 'common property'. It is essentially a 
modification of the Knightian approach, in that it is based on the 
interpretation of 'externality' problems in terms of asset utilisation. 
However it avoids the problematic notion of competitive pricing and 
focuses instead on the manner in which the value of the asset to its 
users may be maximised.
The choice of the term 'common property' is deliberate. This term has 
frequently been used as a synonym for open access to an asset - see, for 
example, in the case of fisheries, Gordon (1954) and Smith (1969). This 
is a misnomer. In such a situation, no property rights at all have been 
assigned. The standard terminology thus carries the implication that 
private property rights are the only possible form of property rights. In 
fact, however, many systems of common property have existed, and others 
can be imagined. In such systems, the decisions regarding access to, and 
use of, property which would be made by a private owner are arrived at 
through some group process such as consensus or majority vote. A 'common 
property' situation can, of course, ultimately be resolved as a complex 
of constrained private property rights, and in some situations this will 
be useful. However, such an analysis would be clumsy and unworkable in 
many cases, and would therefore not render a concept of 'common property' 
superfluous. The analysis of the corporate firm provides a simple 
example. It is possible, and useful, to consider such a firm as a set of 
contractual relationships. However, for a large part of economic analysis 
it must be considered as an entity in itself, with objectives determined 
by its owners as a group.
As well as referring to a possible institutional arrangement, the 
concept of common property is useful as an abstract tool of analysis. 
This will facilitate examination of the optimal use of an asset in which 
there are no property rights, or in which the existing arrangement of 
property rights is unsatisfactory. Sections 1.2 to 1.5 will deal with 
aspects of common property institutions, while Sections 1.6 and 1.7 will 
develop the concept of common property as a tool of analysis.
1.2 Common Property as an Institutional Framework
As has already been noted, economists have typically used the term 
'common property* to denote a situation of open access. The natural 
corollary of such a usage is that the assignment of private property 
rights is a necessary precondition for any progress in the resolution of 
such problems as over-exploitation of fisheries, conflicts in land-use 
relating to forestry and environmental pollution.
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975, p. 714) attack this usage, arguing 
that it is 'at odds with the long-standing meaning of the concept, 
sometimes to the point of being self-contradictory'. They go on to point 
out that:
4 .
"The meaning of the concept 'common property' is well established 
in formal institutions such as the Anglo-Saxon common law, the German 
land law, the Roman law and their successors. It is also 
well-established in informal institutional arrangements based on 
custom, tradition, kinship and mores.
Sometimes both the institution and the resources subject to the 
institution are called the 'commons'. It is helpful, however, to 
differentiate between the concept, the institution, which in many 
variations makes the concept operational in reality, and the 
particular resource that is subject to the institution. In any event, 
economists are not free to use the concept 'common property 
resources' or 'commons' under conditions where no institutional 
arrangements exist. Common property is not 'everybody's property'.
The concept implies that potential resource users who are not members 
of a group of co-equal owners are excluded. The concept 'property'
5 .
has no meaning without this feature of exclusion of all who are not 
either owners themselves or have some arrangement with owners to use 
the resource in question. For example, to describe unowned resources 
(res nullius) as common property (res communes), as many economists 
have done for years in the case of high seas fisheries, is a 
self-contradiction. The problems of managing fisheries in territorial 
waters and those on the high seas have similarities - they are 
fugitive resources - but they are very different in actual and 
potential institutional regulation”.
By examining historical and contemporary examples of common property 
institutions, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop refute the idea summed up in the 
phrase ’the tragedy of the commons' used by Hardin (1968) and Crowe 
(1969), namely that common property will necessarily be overused and 
ultimately degraded. They cite the example of common grazing land which 
was the dominant institution in the medieval European economy and which 
survives to a limited extent to the present day. There were strict limits 
on usage (op. cit. p. 719).
"The beginning and end of the grazing season were set uniformly 
in accordance with forage availability. Grazing was permitted only 
during the daylight hours. Strong controls on grazing were maintained 
by the simple requirement that each individual livestock owner have 
sufficient feed base at his command to support his stock in the 
non-grazing season and during the night. In cases where overgrazing 
was a threat even with the feed base restrictions e.g. with an 
increase in aggregate feed base due to the intensification of 
agriculture, common users were assigned quotas of animals they could 
graze on the commons during the grazing seasons, e.g. 1 horse, 2 
cows, 10 hogs, 6 geese, a process which the English called 
1 stinting‘."
This 'open field' system of common grazing has been examined in some 
detail by Dahlman (1980). Like Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, he refutes the 
idea that common property institutions necessarily led to overgrazing, 
stating (p.95)
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"The communal grazing rights were stinted, and the courts went to a
great deal of trouble to see that each individual did not over-use
the land for grazing purposes".
Dahlman's analysis will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. Its 
most important feature is a demonstration that the disappearance of the 
open field system was not the result of inherent inefficiency or 
overgrazing, but a response to changes in technology and market structure.
It is clear that the 'open access' concept of common property used by 
most economists cannot be applied to actual common property institutions. 
The only alternative in the existing paradigm is to treat common property 
institutions in terms of some set of underlying private property rights. 
The most widespread approach has been to postulate the existence of 
private rights to use the common property resource in a particular way. 
Thus, in the example of the 'stinted' commons, each individual might be 
supposed to have a private right to graze a certain number of animals. 
However, the specification of such 'activity' rights rapidly becomes a 
very complex task. For example, the severity of stinting practices 
depended to some extent on climatic fluctuations. Thus, the rights must 
be specified in terms of a set of possible contingencies. This may be 
satisfactory when the set of possible outcomes, and preferably their 
probabilities, is known in advance. However, severe difficulties arise 
when it is necessary to modify practices such as 'stinting' in response 
to unforeseen contingencies. Events of this kind are frequently treated 
as changes in property rights. Since one of the principal requirements of 
a property rights system is that rights should be stable and enforceable, 
such an interpretation raises substantial problems, which are discussed 
in the following section.
1.3 Changes in Property Rights
One of the most important areas of distinction between the common 
property analysis and previous property rights theories is in the 
treatment of changes in the structure of property rights. Property rights 
theorists in the past have insisted on the importance of security in 
property rights, but have also said that property rights structures must 
develop and change in response to technological developments or changing 
tastes.
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Two types of change in property rights must be distinguished at the 
outset. The first is the voluntary exchange of rights between individuals 
within a given structure. This process of exchange has always been a 
major subject of economic analysis - indeed, in some formulations, it is 
virtually the only subject of analysis. While there are many interesting 
problems in this analysis, they are outside the scope of this study.
The second type of change arises from action by the state, taken in a 
broad sense to include courts, statutory authorities and similar bodies, 
which can call on the coercive powers of the state to define and enforce 
property rights. These actions may include changes in the structure of 
property rights, changes in the set of rights which are enforced within a 
given structure and changes in the distribution of rights between 
individuals. Changes of this type have been analysed by property rights 
theorists using the concepts of 'attenuation* and 'development' of 
rights. However, the tension between these two concepts has gone very 
largely unremarked.
The concept of attenuation is normally used in the analysis of 
particular property rights. Any limitation on the way in which property 
rights may be used constitutes attenuation. The attenuation of property 
rights is, in general, viewed as undesirable (see, for example, the 
discussion in Furubotn and Pejovich 1974, Chapter 1). At the very least, 
it makes the owners of the property rights concerned worse off. The most 
extreme form of attenuation, is of course, the abrogation of rights, and 
any possibility of this will significantly affect the value of existing 
rights.
By contrast, the idea of development is usually applied to property 
rights structures, rather than to individual property rights. The central 
idea here is outlined by Demsetz (1967, p.348), who states 'property 
rights develop to internalise externalities when the gains of 
internalisation become larger than the costs'. Thus, as technology and 
tastes change, the structure of property rights changes, to eliminate 
those externalities which become 'sufficiently' important to warrant it.
A similar, but more broad-ranging hypothesis, is put forward by Posner 
(1972).
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The tension between the concepts of ‘attenuation’ and 'development' 
is most apparent when we ask - how stable should property rights be? If 
we are concerned with development, it seems that the structure of rights 
should be flexible. As technology and tastes change, so does the most 
efficient structure of rights, and the existence of 'transactions costs' 
means that the necessary changes cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange 
alone. On the other hand, a concern with attenuation would suggest that 
rights should be as stable as possible. The absence of security in 
property rights reduces their value, both to their owners and to society 
at large.
This conflict has not received much attention in the literature on 
2property rights. One reason is that analysts using the concept of 
attentuation have largely confined their attention to ’static’ problems, 
involving the best allocation of resources for given technology and 
tastes. Analysis of the development of property rights, on the other 
hand, has focused mainly on the emergence of 'new' property rights. 
Typical cases include the imposition of property rights on previously 
open access resources, where the confusion between common property and 
open access frequently reasserts itself, or the consequences of new 
discoveries such as radio. Contradictions emerge in an acute form only 
when it is recognised that the creation of 'new' rights normally involves 
the abrogation or attenuation of old ones. For example, individual rights 
to clean air involve an attenuation of industrialists' rights to use 
their assets as they please.
The example of 'stinting' is of particular interest. Consider the 
case when unforeseen changes in soil fertility mean that the optimal 
grazing level is reduced. Under a regime of stinting, this will lead to a 
reduction in the number of animals each villager is permitted to graze.
If the property rights over grazing land are interpreted as individual 
rights to graze a set number of animals, it is clear that this reduction 
requires a substantial attenuation of existing rights. This should make 
each individual owner of grazing rights worse off since, in the private 
property rights paradigm, attenuation of rights invariably reduces their 
value. On the other hand, since the new structure of rights yields a more
2 An exception is Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952).
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efficient level of grazing, pasture users are collectively better off as 
a result of the change in stinting practices.
The resolution of this paradox - the fact that 'stinting' is applied 
'across the board' rather than to particular individuals - is clear 
enough intuitively, but is very difficult to incorporate in a theory of 
private property rights. It must be supposed that the initial right - to 
graze a certain number of animals - includes a complex bundle of claims 
to rights in any future property rights structure which may emerge.
A common property analysis offers a much simpler resolution of this 
apparent paradox. 'Stinting' does not involve a change in the property 
rights of the common owners. Rather, these rights are exercised so as to 
achieve a desirable change in land use. Indeed, on this interpretation, 
the imposition of fixed individual grazing rights would represent an 
'attenuation' of the rights of the common owners to manage their property.
The use of a common property framework cannot, of course completely
solve the problems of stability and flexibility in property rights. For
example, common property rights over grazing land would not solve
3problems arising from fertiliser runoff into drinking water. In this 
case, some adjustment of the land-use rights of the common owners might 
be necessary. This will normally require legislative action. It may be 
noted that the powers to undertake such action are derived from the 
theory of 'eminent domain', which states that the ultimate ownership of 
all land is vested in the sovereign. In a democratic society, this theory 
may be regarded as an expression of common property rights held by the 
population as a whole.
1.4 Exclusion, Alienation and Property Rights
The discussion so far has concentrated on one aspect of private and 
common property rights - rights of use or benefit. Two other aspects 
which must be considered in relation to any system of property rights are 
rights of exclusion, and rights of alienation.
3 It might, however, reduce the number of independent parties involved 
and facilitate the attainment of a negotiated solution).
A resource can only be made the subject of property rights if there 
exists a person or group which has, at least potentially, the power to 
prevent some types of use. This statement would seem to imply that pure 
public goods cannot be the subject of property rights. However, almost 
all the standard examples of public goods are in some sense local, and 
therefore subject to exclusion by governments. For instance, an 
individual can be excluded from the benefits of national defence, by the 
simple expedient of deportation. For this reason, and because of interest 
in the private provision of public goods much of the recent literature 
has analysed perfectly excludable public goods.
An example of a resource which is not subject to exclusion (at 
present) is the ozone layer of the earth's atmosphere. This layer yields 
benefits, varying with location and skin pigmentation, to all human 
beings in the form of protection from ultraviolet radiation. It has also 
had a conflicting use, in the view of some scientists, as a receptacle 
for fluorocarbons from spray-cans etc. In the absence of enforceable 
international agreements, no property-based solution to this problem 
could be found. Fortunately, the correlation between skin pigmentation 
and aerosol use is strongly negative, and a number of governments, 
including that of the U.S., were willing to act unilaterally to reduce 
fluorocarbon emissions.
It is more difficult to find interesting examples of goods which are 
inherently inalienable, and it is, tautologically, true that all goods 
must be capable of providing a benefit. However, the possibility of 
providing a right does not mean that such a right will exist in a given 
legal system. For example, systems which involve the entailment of land 
severely limit its alienability. Similarly, there may be no structure of 
rights regarding certain goods, or certain uses of goods. This may occur 
either because the legal system leaves the resource subject to open 
access, or because use of the resource is forbidden altogether (e.g. wild 
marijuana plants).
In addition to determining whether a good may be subject to property 
rights at all, alienability and excludability characteristics constrain 
the type of rights system which may be imposed. For example, rights to 
benefit from national defence or other national public goods cannot be
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separated from rights of residence within a country. However, these 
constraints are not sufficient, in most cases, to determine a single 
system of property rights which must be applied. The same resource may be 
subject, at different times and places, to either common or private 
ownership, or some mixture of the two.
The goods with which economic analysis has traditionally dealt are 
typically subject to pure private property rights, that is rights of use, 
exclusion and alienation are all held by a single individual at any given 
time. Market transactions consist of exchanges of private rights between 
individuals. The basic programme of laissez-faire economists may be 
summarised as the extension of pure private rights to cover as much of 
economic life as possible.
A major part of this programme has been support for increasingly 
finer division of the different possible activities involving a 
particular resource which may be the subject of separate property rights. 
This process has been put forward as an alternative to regulation, which 
has the effect of attenuating more broadly defined property rights.
The polar alternative of pure common property may be defined as a 
situation where rights of use, alienation and exclusion are held by a 
group of co-equal owners, and the way in which these rights are exercised 
is determined by a decision rule which gives all individuals equal 
weight. By contrast with private property rights, a common property 
structure is strengthened if a single basic property right covers all 
actual and potential uses of a given resource.
Rights of exclusion and alienation pose major problems for advocates 
of a (private) 'property rights' analysis of environmental and 
resource-use problems. An example which illustrates these problems is 
that of a smoker who is in the same room as a non-smoker who suffers 
disutility from 'passive smoking'. The property rights analysis would 
suggest that the smoker was the owner of a customary right to smoke. The 
appropriate solution would not be the imposition of legal restrictions or 
Pigouvian taxes; rather bargaining could take place between the smoker 
and the non-smoker, and the smoker could be bribed to forgo his/her 
rights. The converse situation would apply if custom allocated rights to
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the non-smoker. In either case, the situation may be described as one in 
which a particular individual has a right to use a section of the 
atmosphere as she/he sees fit (within some bounds). This right may be 
enforced against other individuals (exclusion) and may be alienated 
through market transactions.
Suppose, however, that the smoker 'gives up' while the non-smoker 
becomes addicted. The ex-smoker, who formerly appeared as the owner of a 
property right, now seems to have none, while the former victim has 
acquired a set of property rights. Yet no market transaction has taken 
place. Clearly, this apparently simple example must be made quite complex 
if it is to be analysed in terms of pure private rights.
A common property analysis which illuminates these difficulties may
be described as follows. The two regimes 'smokers rights' and
'non-smokers rights' may be regarded as representing different usage
rules associated with common property in the atmosphere. In one case
everybody is entitled to smoke, and in the other to breathe clean air. In
4neither case is exclusion permitted. Finally, alienation of the 
relevant rights requires unanimous consent.
This example illustrates the point that changes in property rights 
can be analysed adequately only if both private and common property 
rights are considered. Problems of particular interest arise when the 
change in question involves the conversion of common property to private 
ownership.
1.5 Conversion of Common Property to Private Property
The conversion of common property to private property is an important 
part of the program of orthodox property rights theorists. However, 
because of their lack of an adequate concept of 'common property', they 
have been unable to give a useful analysis of the process of conversion. 
Indeed, this process is seen as, simply, the imposition of (private) 
property rights, where none existed before.
 ^Note that this is not logically necessary; in former times the right 
to smoke was confined by custom to men, but women sometimes had a right 
to exclude 'gentlemen'.
13.
This conception is by no means new. Perhaps its most influential 
proponent was John Locke, whose 'Treatise on Government* (1963) was a 
spirited defence of the rising capitalist order, based on private 
property and contractual exchange of property rights. Locke's analysis 
began with a 'state of nature', in which all land was common property. An 
individual appropriated land to his own private possession by 'mixing his 
labour with the soil'. Locke's conception has remained influential, 
being reflected in the work of writers such as Nozick (1971), and 
Buchanan (1975), as well as in more practical senses, such as the U.S. 
opposition to 'common property' aspects of the Law of the Sea treaty.
Whatever its value as a philosophical debating-point, the Lockean 
concept of the acquisition of property has little to commend it in an 
economic sense. A 'rent-seeking' analysis would suggest that substantial 
resources would be expended on activities which would secure property 
rights. Indeed, the value of the resources expended would approach the 
value of the rights to be secured. It is for this reason that the concept 
of allocating rights by auction, or some other method which involves 
transfers, rather than expenditure, of resources, has been advocated by 
more recent property rights theorists.
A common property analysis requires examination, not only of the new 
private ownership rights, but also of the way in which existing common 
rights are alienated. The simplest case to consider is when a complete 
common property asset is to be sold, either to a single owner or to a new 
group of common owners. In this case the alienation rules discussed in 
Section 1.4 determine the procedure for conversion. It is of somewhat 
more interest to consider cases which are similar to that described by 
Locke, in that an individual can appropriate a part of a common property 
asset. In contrast to the Lockean case, however, the interests of the
 ^ It may be noted that this is a doctrine with more appeal for 
crop-growers than for hunters or nomadic herders. Indeed, the 
colonisation of the New World was, to a large extent, carried out on 
Lockean principles which permitted the appropriation of land which was 
'desert' i.e. subject to common rather than private property rights. 
Thus, while native populations who were engaged in agriculture received 
some limited recognition of their rights, hunters and nomads were simply 
dispossessed.
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common owners must be considered. Rather than an acquisition by natural 
right, the process must be one of mutual benefit.
There are a number of reasons why this may occur. One of the most 
important arises from activities which improve the value of a common 
asset, such as upgrading the carrying capacity of grazing land, or 
providing amenities for recreational use of a lake. It is, of course, 
possible for the owners of an asset to hire factors of production to 
perform these tasks. However, it may be difficult to monitor their work, 
or markets may be too 'thin' to permit an efficient determination of 
prices. In such cases, an alternative solution is to permit those 
carrying out the improvements to appropriate all or part of the benefits 
arising from their work. This may be done either directly (e.g. allowing 
exclusive grazing rights to those who upgrade pastures) or by assignment 
of the right to levy charges on asset users, that is, by a transfer of 
rights of exclusion.
It must be noted that, in general, efficiency requires that less than 
the full value of benefit be appropriated. This is because the total 
benefit includes not only the contribution of those making improvements, 
but also the pre-existing value of the common property asset. If the 
entire value can be appropriated, then the difficulties noted with the 
Lockean concept will re-emerge.
The limitation on appropriability may be obtained by such methods as 
levying a 'rental' charge or by restricting the duration for which 
private rights may be granted. These issues will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4, in connection with the patenting of inventions and 
Plant Variety Rights.
1.6 Common Property as a Tool of Analysis
Sections 1.2 to 1.5 have dealt with various aspects of common 
property as an institutional framework. However, as indicated above, the 
concept of common property may also be used as a tool of analysis. The 
common property approach draws on both the 'externality' and 'asset 
utilisation' frameworks. Its analytical basis is interaction between 
individuals, mediated by an asset, rather than 'direct interaction'. That
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is to say, the impact of one individual's actions on another does not 
arise directly through the utility or production function of the 
'victim', as in the externality approach, but as a result of changes in 
the quality and quantity of services yielded by the asset. To this 
extent, the common property approach is similar to the Knightian asset 
utilisation approach. However, unlike the Knightian approach, it is not 
principally concerned with the determination of competitive pricing 
principles.
The crucial analytical concept is that of the value of an asset, to 
an individual and to a group. The asset may be a natural resource such as 
a river or an air basin, or it may be a produced good such as a road.
The value of the asset depends on the interaction between the quantity 
and quality of the services yielded by the asset and the level of asset 
usage.
The concept of asset value may be clarified by considering a given 
asset in relation to a fixed group of users. Each individual may use the 
asset in a number of different ways. In the simplest case, the individual 
has only two possible actions - using the asset or not using it. More 
generally, there may be a range of different activities each of which may 
be pursued at different levels of intensity.
The utility derived from the asset by any individual will be 
determined by his/her own use of the asset, and by the quality of the 
services provided by the asset which, in turn, will depend on the total 
level of asset usage. It will also be convenient to adopt a definition, 
in terms of equivalent variation, which permits the asset value to be 
expressed as a monetary quantity. An equivalent variation measure implies 
a comparison with some 'base level' of asset usage and the associated 
level of asset quality. For example, in the simple two-option case 
referred to above, it would be natural to specify the base level as one 
where nobody used the asset. The equivalent variation may then be 
expressed as the sum of money which would be equivalent to the increase
6 This distinction is not as vital as may be supposed since 
'productive' activities of various kinds may enhance the usefulness of 
natural resources.
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(or decrease) in utility associated with a shift from the base level to 
some different usage level, which would typically involve a change in 
both the asset quality and the individual's asset usage.
7Thus for each level of asset quality, i.e. of total asset usage , 
the equivalent variation can be expressed as a function of the 
individual's asset usage. The maximum of this function may be described 
as the value of the asset to the individual for a given quality level.
This apparently straightforward definition has important 
consequences. The most important relate to the cost associated with a 
change in asset quality (and to the opportunity cost of maintaining the 
current usage pattern). The cost of pollution to victims is commonly, and 
erroneously, evaluated on the assumption that the victims' actions are 
unchanged. However, the present definition would suggest that the change 
in the value of the asset associated with a change in asset quality 
should be evaluated by comparing the values of the asset given that the 
victim makes optimal use of it for each quality level.
A useful example to consider is pollution of a beach. The appropriate 
measure of the damage is not the cost which would be incurred if swimmers 
continued to use the beach at the level prevailing before the beach was 
polluted. Nor can it be evaluated ex post, in terms of the marginal cost 
to the few hardy individuals who continue to venture out. Rather it must 
be measured in terms of the losses of asset value to those who used to 
swim and now cannot do so (or do so and enjoy it less). While this is 
quite a simple point, the use of the Pigovian and Coasian frameworks 
tends to obscure it, and this has led many users of these approaches into 
difficulty.
The concept of the value of an asset to an individual may be extended 
to that of the aggregate value of an asset to a group of individuals. The 
central problem of common property theory is, then, to establish a usage 
pattern which maximises the total value of an asset to a group of owners.
 ^This formulation is based on the assumption that each individual's 
usage is negligible. Strictly speaking, we should refer to total usage by 
all other individuals.
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This optimal allocation may be viewed in terms of an extension of the 
Pigouvian rule that marginal private benefit should equal marginal social 
cost. An optimum is a point where the benefits to any individual of 
changing resource use would be exceeded by the associated reduction in 
the value of the asset to all other users.
1.7 A Formal Model
In this section, the ideas discussed in the previous section are 
presented in a formal mathematical model. Although the model employs 
standard economic tools such as the calculus of optimisation, it may 
appear somewhat unfamiliar in nature. This reflects the deep divergences 
between the standard externality approach and the common property 
approach. Individuals' actions affect others, neither through direct 
changes in utility and production functions, nor through market prices, 
but through changes in the quality of a common property asset.
The asset is considered in relation to a set of n individuals and a 
range of m possible activities. Each individual i may choose between 
possible vectors of activities ai e Rm . The set of activity vectors 
available to each individual is denoted A^ and is a subset of Rm .
The total usage of the asset is denoted by a, where 
(1.7.1) a = £ . a.l l
Asset quality q(a) is a function of total usage. Since asset quality may 
have a number of different aspects, q will be assumed to be a vector 
q e Rk.
Each individuals utility will depend on his/her use of the asset and 
on asset quality. Thus,
(1.7.2) Ui = v i (a^ yi, q)
In order to convert these utility levels to monetary equivalents it 
is necessary to specify a base level of usage a^ for each individual. 
The base level of usage a° and asset quality q° are defined as above.
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It is now possible to define an equivalent variation measure of the value 
of the asset to individual i under any other pattern of usage. The asset 
value v^ (a y ^ ,  q) is defined by
(1.7.3) U. (ai, yi + vi, q°) = IK (a.., y ^  q)
In 1.7.3 the quality measure q depends on the actions of individual 
i. It is frequently more useful to define the quality of the asset as a 
function of the use made of the asset by individuals other than i. This 
may be written as
(1.7.4) a. = a.°+ Z. a.i i 3 / 1 3
and q^ may be defined as q(a^). The equivalent variation v^ may be 
written as v^ (a^ , y^, q^) and the maximum value of the asset to 
individual i is defined as
(1.7.5) V. (y^ qj = max vi (ai# y if q^
(In cases where the individual's impact on asset quality is negligible 
q^ may be equated to q.)
The most general social optimisation problem yielded by this model is
that of maximising a social welfare function W(U.,....,U ). A more1 n
tractable problem is that of maximising the total value of the asset
(1.7.6) V = E. v.l l
In order for the solutions of these problems to coincide fairly
stringent conditions must apply. The most important are that the
'distributional weights' attached by the social welfare function W to
each individual should be equal and that the solution to (1.7.6) should
be independent of the choice of base levels a ..a1 n *
The first of these problems may be dealt with, if necessary, by 
replacing (1.7.6) with an appropriate weighted sum. This problem will not
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be considered explicitly in most of what follows. The second condition 
will apply if v^ is always 'small' in relation to y^, so that 
equivalent variations between different positions are additive (and equal 
to compensating variation). Except where income effects play a major role 
in the analysis, terms in y^ will be dropped from now on, in the 
interests of analytical simplicity.
The set (a^ , a2*...an) of activities which maximise V may be 
determined for the general case by an iterative procedure. Although 
specific cases will often admit simpler solutions, the general procedure 
illustrates important problems in the apparently simple concept of 'asset 
value'. Failure to consider these problems has led users of other 
approaches into serious error.
Beginning from the base position a°, it is clearly possible to 
define for any individual i, the activity vector a^* which maximises v 
(on the assumption that all other individuals remain at their base 
activity). We have
(1.7.7) V = v. (a., q°) + v. (a°, q)
If (1.7.7) is differentiable, we may write the maximising conditions as
(1.7.8) 9v^/3a^ + Zj^ 3Vj/3q 3q/3a^ = 0
A number of points may be made about (1.7.8). First, it is essentially 
equivalent to the standard externality formulation. The first term of the 
LHS represents marginal private benefit (or cost) while the second term 
represents marginal external effects. Moreover, a condition of this kind 
is necessary for an optimum, except for a corner solution where the 
condition will involve Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. This may be proved by 
considering the case when the (arbitrarily chosen) base activities are 
equal to the optimal activities for all individuals other than i.
However, conditions (1.7.8) holding for all individuals 1, 2...n are 
not sufficient for an optimum. Global convexity in addition to these 
conditions would, of course be sufficient. However, as has been shown by 
Baumöl and Oates, externalities tend automatically to generate
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non-convexities (see section 2.2). If we are to approach a solution in 
the presence of non-convexities, we must go further.
Since the choice of base is arbitrary, the argument above establishes 
the possibility of defining
(1.7.9) V*^ = max V (aj_,... ,a^ _,...,an)
for any set (a^,...,a._^,a^+^,...,an). Thus we may define
(1.7.10) V*^ = max (V*^)
= max (max (V(a^,...,an))
a . a . i 3
Equation (1.7.10) has a particularly interesting interpretation when 
there are only two individuals, a polluter (individual 1) and a pollutee 
(individual 2). The pollutee is defined by the fact that his actions have 
no effect on asset quality and hence on the utility of the polluter. Thus
(1.7.11) max V(alf a2) = v(a1,q(a1)) + max v(a2/q(a1)) 
al'a2
= v + V 1 V2
Thus we may derive the optimising condition for the polluter as
(1.7.12) 3v]/8a1 + 3V2/3q 3q/3a1 = 0
The difference between this condition and (1.7.8) is that what is 
referred to is the change in the maximum value of the asset. That is, 
instead of evaluating the impact of the change in asset quality on the 
pollutee, assuming that a particular activity is undertaken at all times, 
the pollutee1s adjustment to changed asset quality is taken into account. 
This point will be discussed further in section 2.2.
The step from (1.7.9) to (1.7.10) may be repeated iteratively, so as 
to obtain for any i
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(1.7.13) V* = max (max (V (a^, a2...an))
ai (ajsj^i)
Once again there is a particularly simple interpretation if individual i 
is unaffected by any quality changes created by the remaining 
individuals. If we write
(1.7.14) V± = vi ,
then
(1.7.15) max V(alf a2...an) = vi (ai, q°) + max Vi(alfa2...an)
Thus, the maximising problem (1.7.13) involves two separate parts; 
the value of the asset to individual i, and the impact of his/her actions 
through asset quality, on the maximum value of the asset to all other 
users combined.
This simple separation does not apply strictly when the determination 
of the optimal activities for other users must take into account their 
effects on individual i. However, in cases involving large numbers, 
will usually be approximately equal to V, and the optimal actions for the 
group of users excluding i will be approximately the same whether or not 
their effect on i is considered. Thus, we can assert that the social 
benefits of i's choice of activity are equal to the private benefits plus 
the change in the value of the asset to other users.
The converse case arises when the actions of individual i have no 
effect on asset quality, and hence on the welfare of the other users. In 
this case, maximisation of V* with respect to a^ is equivalent to 
maximising v^, and this is true regardless of the activities of the 
other individuals. Thus, (1.7.13) yields
(1.7.16) V* = max (V.^  (a^ q) + )
Thus, while individual i will achieve the optimal activity level without 
considering anything but private costs and benefits, the other 
individual's choice of action must take his/her interests into account.
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Chapter 2
COMMON PROPERTY AND COMPETING PARADIGMS
2.1 Introduc tion
In this chapter, the main existing approaches to the problems under 
discussion will be analysed in detail. A number of well known 
difficulties with these approaches will be discussed from a common 
property approach, and some new problems will be raised. These problems 
arise because the basic paradigms used in the traditional approaches 
cannot be applied simply to the majority of real-world problems of 
interest. Erroneous conclusions arise when the problem is simplified so 
as to fit the solution method. Alternatively, if the problem is treated 
in its full complexity, it may be impossible to reach any useful 
conclusions.
The chapter will focus on the work of a number of major writers using 
the existing approaches and will seek to show where they have fallen into 
error, and how a common property approach might have dealt with the 
problem. This form of critique is not new. Coase (1960) used it in his 
attack on the externalities approach developed by Pigou, and Mohring and 
Boyd (1971) in turn criticised both Coase and Pigou stating that 
'analysis of any technological externality problem is both easier and 
less prone to error' if their asset utilisation framework is employed. It 
will be shown that this framework was not enough to prevent Mohring and 
Boyd themselves from falling into error.
In view of the debate and critical analysis which has already gone 
on, on many of the problems discussed here will be fairly well known. 
However, a critical analysis from a common property viewpoint casts a new 
light on a number of these arguments.
2.2 The Externality Framework
Pigou's (1924) externality analysis was the first important attempt 
to provide a framework for dealing with pollution and similar problems. 
Despite the criticisms of Coase and others, it is still extremely
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influential. Indeed, it has largely set the tone of the debate, even for 
those who do not accept the externality approach. In particular, the 
elementary case of a unilateral externality with a single 'polluter' and 
a single 'victim' has continued to be the focus of attention, and has 
been generalised to cover more complex problems such as congestion. By 
contrast, the locus classicus of economics in general has been the large 
numbers case of competitive markets, with two-person problems such as 
bilateral monopoly receiving only limited attention.
In other respects, however, the externality analysis is firmly in the 
neoclassical tradition. In particular, the concept of externality put 
forward by Pigou is essentially marginal, and the policy thrust of the 
analysis is the re-establishment of the equality between private and 
social marginal costs and benefits, which is the basis of the claim that 
competitive markets yield an optimal allocation of resources.
Unfortunately, marginal analysis is not very useful unless production 
and consumption sets are convex, and detrimental externalities tend in 
themselves to generate non-convexities. This may be seen easily in the 
case of a two-output one-input economy with linear technology in each 
industry. A detrimental externality implies that the output produced in 
one industry will be reduced if the other operates so that the production 
set is a subset of the convex hull formed by the two points of complete 
specialisation i.e. the production set is non-convex. This point is 
analysed in detail by Starrett (1972) and Baumöl and Bradford (1972) and 
is presented in a non-technical fashion in Baumöl and Oates (1975, Ch. 8).
A possibility of particular interest is that of complete 
specialisation in the industry which generates the externality. In this 
situation, the externality is, in the terminology of Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (1962), 'inframarginal'. That is, a marginal change in the 
level of the 'polluting' industry has no effect on any other firm. 
Moreover, it is not even clear that the externality is 'relevant' in the 
Buchanan-Stubblebine sense, since no existing firm is affected, although 
potential firms are prevented from operating. Indeed, in the case of 
local specialisation (discussed by Baumöl and Oates), this technological 
externality may be mistaken for a pecuniary one. By making a particular 
locality unsuitable for pollution-sensitive activities, the polluting
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activity pushes up the price of land elsewhere, and this is the only way 
in which its effects are felt.
From a common property viewpoint, of course, the effects of the 
polluting activity on the usefulness of land (and/or) air are the crux of 
the problem. Only in special cases can these effects be measured by 
marginal costs actually imposed on individuals. In the case of local 
specialisation, there are no such effects at all, and hence no basis for 
the formulation of a Pigo vian tax. By contrast, the effects of the 
polluting activity on the value of surrounding land can be measured in 
the market place (see e.g. Ridker and Henning 1967, or Lind 1973) and an 
appropriate charge imposed on the polluter.
An alternative possibility raised by this discussion is that of 
'internalising the externality'. It is frequently argued that, if the 
polluting firm and the affected firms are merged (in this case through 
land purchase by the polluter), there will be no problems. This may be 
true if the polluter is forced to pay the pre-pollution land value, since 
the effect is the same as levying a charge for damage. If, however, the 
polluter is free to pay the market price, then the process simply amounts 
to allowing the victims to take their losses in a lump sum rather than as 
a reduced stream of income. Moreover, while efficiency is restored 
ex-post, the incentive effects of this solution are disastrous, since 
there is, if anything, a positive incentive to pollute. Those who 
advocate this solution are guilty of what Demsetz (1969) calls, 'if only 
people were different' fallacy.
The discussion thus far has centred on the limitations imposed by 
marginal analysis in the externalities framework. More fundamental 
problems arise from the fact, pointed out by Mohring and Boyd, that the 
externality framework is based on the analysis of direct interaction 
between individuals rather than on asset utilisation. Mohring and Boyd 
point out some of the difficulties this creates in the analysis of 
congestion. Another area where the 'direct interaction' perspective 
creates problems is that of compensation to victims.
In the externality framework, compensation is typically assessed in 
terms of the difference between the victim's welfare in the presence of
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the externality, and that which would apply if the polluter were
constrained to adopt some base level or 'zero1 action, while the victim's
actions were unchanged. In general, payment of compensation on this basis
does not give victims any incentive to reduce the impact of pollution.
Compensation is, therefore, opposed in most cases by economists working
in the Pigouvian framework (the exception is in cases of 'depletable'
externality which will be discussed in the following section). By
contrast, the common property approach suggests that compensation should
be based on the change in the value, to the victim, of the asset as a
result of the polluter's move from the base level. As defined in Section
1.6, the asset value is the equivalent variation associated with the
action which maximises the victim's welfare for a given level of asset
quality. This value depends, in principle, only on the asset quality, and0not on the course of action adopted by the victim. Thus, the change in 
asset value associated with pollution is independent of the victim's 
actions, and the payment of compensation has no efficiency effects. The 
equity effects of compensation will, of course, depend on the 
determination of the base situation.
The difficulties arising from the direct interaction approach are 
particularly severe when compensation is considered in a situation of 
congestion. Consider, for example, a congested road used by n identical 
motorists. Each motorist generates and incurs the same amount of damage 
from congestion. Thus, a proposal to levy a Pigo vian tax and pay 
compensation would have no effect whatsoever. Moreover, the imposition of 
a tax without compensation would generally make all road users (though 
not the recipients of the tax money) worse off. The point is, of course, 
that each motorist must drive in order to obtain their share of the 
compensation. The common property solution would be to pay compensation 
depending only on the total level of congestion , while charging taxes 
which depended on the individual's road usage.
The discussion in this section has raised some general difficulties 
with the externality approach. In the following section a specific
O Of course, if the victim chooses a sub-optimal course of action, 
measurement difficulties may arise in practice.
Q Or, more precisely, compensation based on the congestion attributable 
to all other drivers.
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application of the approach - Baumöl and Oates' (1975) analysis of 
depletable and undepletable externalities - will be critically examined. 
The problems encountered in this analysis may be traced, in large 
measure, to the fundamental defects in the externality framework which 
have been described above.
2.3 Depletable Externalities and Common Property
The claim that the various problems usually described as 
'externalities' can be dealt with by an appropriate allocation of private 
property rights is almost as old as the concept of externality itself. It 
has been upheld in various forms by Knight (1924), Coase (1960) and 
Mohring and Boyd (1971).
Baumöl and Oates (1975) make a more limited version of this claim by 
distinguishing between depletable (or private) and undepletable (public) 
externalities. They define (p. 19) an undepletable externality as one for 
which 'an increase in the consumption of the good by one individual does 
not reduce its availability to others'. They go on to argue that, in 
general, it will be inappropriate to make any charge on, or payment to, 
consumers of an undepletable externality, and hence that the definition 
of private property rights will not be sufficient to achieve an optimal 
allocation of resources.
By contrast, they claim, we may regard 'depletable externalities not 
as externalities at all but as cases where institutional impediments make 
it impossible to impose the appropriate price'. However, the implicit 
definition of depletable externalities quoted above (and hence the scope 
of the claim made about them) is somewhat ambiguous. It could be 
interpreted as applying to any externality which is not undepletable. 
Alternatively, it could be taken to apply only to those externalities for 
which consumption of a given amount by one individual leads to an equal 
reduction in the amount consumed by others. This second interpretation 
would leave a range of intermediate cases corresponding to congestion.
Unfortunately, Baumöl and Oates give support for both 
interpretations. They first (p.22) consider fisheries as an example of a 
depletable positive externality. In particular, they examine a lake, to 
which all fishermen have free access and where 'the haul of one fisherman
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reduces the expected size of the catch of others, a clear case of a 
depletable externality'. They go on to argue that an optimal allocation 
of resources could be achieved under private ownership of the lake either 
through a profit-maximising access charge, or by the operations of a firm 
which hired fishermen.
This example corresponds to the first definition of depletable 
externality, since the total catch is not fixed, but increases with the 
number of fishermen. On the other hand, their formal analysis of 
depletable externalities (pp. 45-48) employs the second definition. 
Intermediate cases involving congestion are analysed as consisting of a 
combination of depletable and undepletable externalities. It is argued 
that these 'mixed' externalities cannot, in general, be dealt with 
adequately by private ownership. Thus, the results for private ownership 
are claimed to apply only on the second definition. Hereafter, we shall 
refer to externalities satisfying this strict definition as 'fully 
depletable'.
In order to see how Baumöl and Oates' analyses yield apparently 
contradictory results, it useful to consider in greater detail the 
examples they give. Some further examples will then be given to 
illustrate a wider range of possibilities.
The fisheries example is presented in graphical form, but an 
algebraic approach will be used here."^ The fishermen are assumed to be 
identical and to receive an average catch of f(N), where N is the total 
number of fishermen and f'(N) <0. If f(N) is expressed in monetary
terms, N will increase until the average return is W, the wage available 
in alternative employment. However, because of the reduction in the catch 
of others, the social marginal product of a new fisherman at this point 
is less than W, and it may even be negative.
In considering the role of private ownership, we may note that an 
access charge P must satisfy the condition
(2.3.1) P = f(N)-W
(10) For simplicity, Baumöl and Oates' own notation will be followed.
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Hence, the problem of maximising profits from an access charge is the 
same as that of maximising N(f(N)-W), the total social surplus arising 
from the lake. This is also the profit which would be earned by a firm 
which hired fishermen. The marginal condition is
(2.3.2) f(N)+Nf'(N) = W
The second example given by Baumöl and Oates is that of a number of 
competitive firms that raise flowers for sale to commercial florists and 
also 'by their industry's custom' admit visitors to their gardens to view 
the flowers, without charge.
The firm's production decisions will be made without reference to any 
benefits to visitors unless they impose a charge. This creates two 
difficulties. First, any non-zero price must exclude some visitors. If 
the externality is undepletable (i.e. there is no crowding), this is 
clearly suboptimal, since each additional visitor would gain a benefit 
without imposing any costs. If each visitor imposes congestion costs on 
the others, some charge will be appropriate. However, this charge will 
not be enough to achieve a socially optimum level of production, except 
in the case of a fully depletable externality, that is, the case when the 
number of visitors is fixed, given the supply of gardens. The second 
problem is that, except in the fully depletable case, it is very 
difficult to define a competitive price. The problem is essentially that 
addressed in studies of the competitive supply of public goods e.g. 
Oakland (1974), Thompson (1968), Demsetz (1970).
There are two main differences between the garden example and that of 
the fisheries. First, in the fisheries example, the asset generating the 
externality, the lake, was assumed to be in fixed supply, in the sense 
that its owner could take no action to improve its productivity. Second, 
the benefits were assumed to be equal for all consumers of the 
externality i.e. fishermen, at any given level of usage.
The importance of the fixity of the asset is obvious. It means that 
the price charged need only achieve efficiency in consumption, whereas in 
the general case it must achieve efficiency in production as well. Thus, 
if the supply of gardens were fixed, and there was no crowding, the
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'customary' solution in which visitors were admitted without charge, 
would be optimal (although it is not clear that this is also a 
competitive equilibrium).
The second crucial feature of the fishing problem arises from the 
assumption that all fishermen receive the same average catch (given the 
total number of fishermen). This in turn implies that the effect of any 
additional fishermen is the same for all existing fishermen. Similarly 
the effect of removing any one fisherman is the same for all those 
remaining (and is independent of which fisherman is removed). Note that 
these 'symmetry' conditions also apply for an undepletable externality, 
since the external effect on any marginal consumer is zero by definition. 
The effect of removing this assumption may be illustrated by a 
modification of the fisheries example.
Suppose that, instead of commercial fishermen, the lake is used by 
sports fishermen who vary in ability and tastes. As in the previous 
example, the presence of other fishermen reduces the welfare of others, 
either by direct crowding effects or by reducing the expected catch per 
user.
The value to fisherman i of a day on the lake is given by
(2.3.3) v1 = v ° q(n)
where v^ is the value in the absence of any crowding, and asset 
quality q(n) is a monotonically decreasing function of the number of 
users. If the fishermen are ordered so that i > j if and only if 
v(i) < v(j), and there are sufficiently many fishermen that n may be 
treated as continuous, we may write the problem of maximising the value 
of the lake as
(2.3.4) maxn W(n) q(n) ,
where
(2.3.5) W(n) = /n v1 dio
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The first order condition is
(2.3.6) q'(n) W(n) + q(n) W'(n) = q'(n) W(n) + q(n) v(n) = 0 .
By contrast a profit-maximising firm would earn a revenue equal to 
nv(n) if the admission fee was set so as to yield n users. Thus the 
condition for profit maximisation is
(2.3.7) v° q(n) + nq(n) 3v°/9n + q'(n) v° = 0 .n n
Condition (2.3.7) differs from (2.3.6) in two ways. First, the lake owner 
acts as a monopolist and sets prices to take account of the downward 
sloping demand curve which arises from differences in tastes. This 
accounts for the term nq(n)9v°/9n. Second, the firm takes account of 
crowding effects but only insofar as they affect the price which can be 
charged and hence the revenue received. This accounts for the term 
nq(n) 9v°/9n which is smaller in absolute magnitude than the 
corresponding term q'(n) W(n) in (2.3.6).
The first of these differences tends to contract output and the 
second to expand it, relative to the 'socially optimal' level. The 
influence of monopoly behaviour may be removed by setting up an 'almost 
competitive' model as follows. Suppose that fishing lakes are supplied by 
a range of competing firms. Marginal users are indifferent between lakes, 
assuming the crowding effects are the same, while some 'inframarginal' 
users prefer particular lakes e.g. because of convenient locations. Then, 
if the price for a lake j with q^ (n_.) = 1 is denoted p*, the value of 
a day on lake i is given by p*qi(ni). Condition (2.3.7) is now 
replaced by
(2.3.8) P* q^(ni) + np* q^'(ni) = 0.
(Note that there will be a second local optimum satisfying (2.3.7) in 
which only 'inframarginal' individuals use the lake. If the optimal 
number of marginal users given by (2.3.8) is small, this will be the 
global optimum.)
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In the 'almost competitive' case, the number of users is 
unambiguously greater than is required for efficiency. The opposite 
result could only arise if inframarginal users are less sensitive to 
crowding than marginal users, and this somewhat implausible case is 
precluded by the functional form used in our example.
The examples given above have covered a wide range of externalities 
which are not fully depletable. They show that the contradictions in the 
results derived by Baumöl and Oates arise from different assumptions 
about the nature of the asset from which the externalities arise. There 
is, however, a third assumption, which is common to both of the examples 
given by Baumöl and Oates, and is crucial to their argument that private 
ownership of the asset in question will resolve the problems associated 
with a fully depletable externality. This is the assumption that 
consumption of the externality is independent of any other activity 
undertaken by the individual in question. This means that, in the case of 
a fully depletable externality, each individual can adopt whatever 
consumption bundle he chooses, subject only to the overall budget 
constraint that the externality is completely consumed.1'1' In this case, 
it is quite clear that, if pricing is possible, the 'depletable 
externality' is no different from a private good.
However, it is quite possible to construct examples where this is not 
the case. Consider, for example, the case of a road used by both cars and 
trucks. The trucks occasionally spill their loads, thereby blocking the 
road, which must be cleared by the next driver to pass. For simplicity, 
we may consider only the cases when this driver is in a car. The 
externality generated by the trucks is clearly fully depletable; however, 
individuals' consumption levels are determined by the number of road 
trips they consume. The problems raised are now as severe as for the 
cases discussed above. Suppose, for example, that the provision of trips 
to motorists is costless. Then the optimal price for consumption 
efficiency is zero but, in this case, a firm owning the road would have 
no incentive to curb the activities of trucks in any way. Alternatively, 
we may suppose that the price of an uninterrupted trip is 'competitively'
11 Strictly speaking, this constaint may be slack for a positive 
externality which is subject to satiation.
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determined at P*, and that the cost of an interruption is higher for 
inframarginal than for marginal users. For a given number of trucks, the 
probability of a given driver encountering a blockage declines as the 
number of drivers increases. Thus, the price charged to car drivers will 
be determined by a condition analogous to (2.3.8), with the number of 
drivers being less than the socially optimal level.
If trucks (which are assumed to be unaffected by road blockages) are 
also charged a competitively determined price, then the number of trucks 
will be restricted to take account of their adverse effect on revenue 
from cars. However, no account will be taken of their effects on the 
consumer surplus received by inframarginal users. Thus, there will in 
general be too many trucks using the road under private ownership, and 
this will adversely affect the welfare of car users.
2.4 Private and Common Property Rights
The most important alternative to the externality framework has been 
the 'property rights' analysis stemming from the work of Coase (1960). 
Coase made a number of criticisms of the externality approach, including 
some related to the points discussed in previous sections. His 
fundamental critique, however, was based on what has come to be known as 
'Coase's theorem'.
The Coase theorem states that externalities do not create any 
necessity for intervention on efficiency grounds provided that 'the 
market system worked smoothly'. Coase argued that a bilateral externality 
situation could be represented by an allocation of property rights. If 
rights are allocated to 'polluters' then they are free to do as they wish 
without hindrance. If they are allocated to 'victims' then they are free 
to put a stop to polluting activities.
The Coase theorem claims that provided there are no transactions 
costs, bargaining between the parties (including, if necessary, the 
payment of bribes), would lead to an efficient use of resources 
independent of the initial allocation of property rights. As Mishan 
(1971) points out, this claim is not strictly correct when income effects 
are taken into account; an initial allocation of rights to 'victims' is
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likely to increase the demand for clean air. Nonetheless, Coase's insight 
has had a major impact on the way economists think about these problems.
While the Coase theorem has had a major theoretical impact, the most 
important aspect of Coase's work was his analysis of the situation where 
'transactions costs' prevented bargaining between the parties from 
reaching an optimal solution. In this case, the final allocation of 
productive resources will be substantially affected by the initial 
allocation of property rights.
The traditional Pigovian framework suggested the view that an optimal 
allocation could be reached either by the imposition of a tax, or by the 
assignment of property rights to victims through a liability rule. Coase 
concerned himself mainly with the latter possibility, and did not 
consider the case of taxes without compensation to victims. He argued 
that a liability rule gave victims no incentive to undertake measures 
which reduced the damage they incurred. Thus, there were some adverse 
effects whether property rights were assigned to polluters or to victims.
As was pointed out in Section 2.2, claims of this kind are valid only 
if compensation to victims is determined within an externality-style 
direct interaction framework. Compensation based on the change in value 
of a common-property asset is effectively 'lump-sum', in that it does not 
affect the incentives to victims to adopt cost-minimising measures.
Coase argued that the allocation of property rights must be made so 
as to achieve the most productive use of resources, and that the common 
law decisions of the courts had, in fact, followed this criterion to a 
significant extent. Thus, he claimed, the existence of externalities did 
not, in general, provide a ground for legislative intervention in the 
economy.
The mechanism of 'zoning by court order' will be considered in more 
depth in the following section. The remainder of this section will be 
devoted to an analysis of the Coasian theoretical framework. A number of 
problems with this framework have been briefly referred to above.
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The most important problem is that Coasian property rights normally 
refer to activities rather than assets. As Mohring and Boyd put it, they 
are 'typically characterised in terms of A's right to do something to, or 
to collect damages from, B'. Because Coase examines a series of once-off, 
two-person cases, he never considers the existence of more than one 
property right. In every case either A has a right and B none, or vice 
versa. In practice, however, rights to undertake a given activity will 
rarely be the property of a single individual. In most cases large 
numbers of people, possibly the entire population, will possess the 
relevant rights, and negotiation of unanimous consent for change in the 
set of permitted activities would be impractical.
This last point largely explains the general absence of 'Coasian' 
bargaining over property rights even in what appear to be small-numbers' 
or 'two-party' cases. Consider the example of a smoker and a person 
allergic to smoke, in a room containing a large number of people who are 
indifferent with respect to smoking. In order to effect a change of 
regime, say from 'smokers rights' to 'non-smokers rights' it is necessary 
to bribe, not only the smoker, but all the people in the room to give up 
their customary rights. Otherwise, any of these people would be free to 
begin smoking for the strategic purpose of extracting a bribe. Moreover, 
not only people actually present but also potential entrants, must give 
their consent. Thus, even when only two people are directly involved, an 
attempt to effect a change in common property rights through Coasian 
bargaining may involve all of the strategic problems of the large numbers 
case.
These difficulties are generally ascribed by the Coasian school to 
'transactions costs' which prevent the parties from reaching an 
agreement. The concept of transaction costs is a deceptive one. 
Transaction costs are often treated as if they were technological givens 
like transport costs - see Stigler (1967) - when in fact they are almost 
entirely dependent on institutional arrangements (like the structure of 
property rights). This treatment leads naturally to the idea that 
transactions costs will be lowest when only two parties are directly 
involved, just as transport costs are lowest over short distances. 
Unfortunately, this analogy is highly misleading. In almost all cases of 
two-party bargaining, a large number of other parties are potentially
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involved. For example, bribing one firm not to pollute the atmosphere 
will almost certainly attract the attention of others (or spur the 
creation of new ones). Conversely, an out-of-court settlement with one 
victim of pollution will almost certainly generate a rash of litigation.
Thus, transactions costs are essentially strategic rather than
technological. They will typically increase with the size of the
unappropriated rent involved and decrease with the cost of preventing the
finalisation of an agreement. For example, if a readily available
commodity of standard quality is to be auctioned, the available surplus
is very small and transactions costs are low. The number of people
12participating in the auction is generally irrelevant.
The case of Coasian bargaining provides a complete contrast. The 
surplus involved is frequently quite large, and a two-party agreement can 
typically be upset by a simple declaration that a third party intends to 
exercise the right to undertake some activity. Thus, the conclusion of an 
agreement is rarely possible, and the only relevant aspect of the Coasian 
analysis is the suggestion that property rights should be allocated so as 
to ensure the most valuable use of resources.
Like subsequent users of the property rights paradigm, Coase ignores 
the problem of stability in rights, which was discussed in Section 1.3. 
Security is crucial to a system of property rights. By contrast, the most 
important feature of a market economy is the fact that, as technology, 
tastes and population change, often in an unpredictable fashion, so does 
the optimal allocation of resources. A once-off allocation of 'activity' 
rights, even with the use of contingent rights to cover identifiable 
possibilities of change in the future, cannot solve the dynamic problem 
of resource use unless rights can be traded easily, that is, unless 
transactions costs are low.
Consider, for example, the establishment of a pollution-generating 
factory in an area where there is a good deal of free (or low-cost) land.
1 ? Indeed, transactions costs will typically be significant only if the 
market is 'thin' i.e. very few people are involved.
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If the benefits generated by the factory exceed the costs imposed on 
users of nearby land, then the property rights theory would recommend an 
allocation of 'polluters rights' to the factory owners (and hence to 
potential polluters as well). Suppose, however, that the population and 
the value of land increases. It may now be more economically efficient to 
restrict pollution. But in an 'activity rights' regime this can only be 
done by buying out all holders of rights to pollute, a task which will 
normally be impossible. Demsetz's comment on socialism seems appropriate 
here. The Coasian system 'resolves static problems of allocations rather 
neatly. But this is only because all the dynamic problems of production 
are ignored' (1969, p. 12).
This implication might be avoided, if it were supposed that only 
actual polluters held a right to pollute. In this case Coasian bargaining 
might be possible, since at least one group would be fixed in size. 
Unfortunately, this would create a positive incentive to pollute, since 
polluters would be rewarded by an allocation of property rights.
Coase's own analysis did not make clear which of these regimes he 
advocated, and this ambiguity is fundamental to the dispute between 
Mohring and Boyd (1971) and Gould (1975). Mohring and Boyd took the 
second interpretation and pointed out the inefficiency involved. Gould, 
who sought to refute their argument, used the first interpretation and 
upheld the theoretical validity of the Coase theorem in the absence of 
transactions costs. However, he did not consider the more relevant case 
when transactions costs are present.
2.5 Property Rights and the Law of Nuisance
Coase supported his analysis of bilateral externalities with a 
detailed discussion of a number of cases concerning the common law tort 
of (private) nuisance. At first sight, this area of the law would seem 
admirably suited to a (private) property rights analysis since it arises 
out of the duties owed by neighbouring owners or occupiers of land. 
'Nuisances are interferences by owners or occupiers of property with the
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use or enjoyment of neighbouring property' (Talbot, J. quoted in Heuston 
1977).13 14
In Coase's view, the law of nuisance determines what rights to 
undertake particular activites, or to prevent one's neighbour from 
undertaking such activities, arise out of private property rights in 
land. As we have seen, Coase's analysis suggests that
(a) in the absence of 'transactions costs', it does not matter how these 
rights are allocated;
(b) if transactions costs are high rights should be allocated so that 
land will achieve its most productive use.
Coase illustrates the first point by reference to the case of Sturges 
v Bridgman (1879). The parties were a confectioner who used machinery in 
connection with his business and a doctor occupying neighbouring 
premises. When the doctor built a consulting room adjoining the 
confectioner's kitchen, the noise and vibration from the machines made 
his work difficult. He therefore sought, and obtained, an injunction to 
prevent the confectioner from using his machinery. Coase (p.7) states
'The court's decision established that the doctor had the right 
to prevent the confectioner from using his machinery. But, of course, 
it would have been possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in 
the legal ruling by means of a bargain between the parties. The 
doctor would have been willing to waive his right and allow the 
machinery to continue in operation if the confectioner would have 
paid him a sum of money which was greater than the loss of income
^  As I am mainly concerned with the economic implications of the law, 
rather than with specific questions of jurisprudence, I have worked 
mainly from secondary sources such as Salmond on Torts (R. Heuston ed.). 
These, rather than the law reports, will be given as citations.
14 The restriction of rights of action under nuisance to the legal 
holder of property rights is very strict. Thus in Malone v Lasky, (1907, 
described in Heuston 1977) the vibrations of an engine in an adjoining 
building led to an injury to the wife of the occupier of some premises, 
but it was held that, having no property right, she could not recover 
damages, at least for nuisance.
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which he would suffer from having to move to a more costly or less 
convenient location or from having to curtail his activities at this 
location.'
In this, and a number of other examples, Coase lays great stress on 
the symmetry of the situation. He suggests that, had the court awarded 
the confectioner the right to operate the machine, the doctor could pay 
him not to. Thus, he argues, in the absence of transactions costs, the 
ultimate equilibrium will be independent of the initial allocation of 
rights.
However, this symmetry is largely illusory. If the confectioner pays 
the doctor to waive the rights of exclusion awarded by the court, he does 
not thereby acquire a right to operate machinery. This still constitutes 
a nuisance, and a subsequent owner, or any other neighbour who was 
inconvenienced by it, would have the right to seek an injunction against 
the confectioner. Even as between the original parties, such an 
agreement, technically termed a licence, has only a limited degree of 
force in law. For example, it is revocable at the will of licensor, in 
this case the doctor (Heuston, op. cit., p.74). Heuston (ibid, p.78) 
states that this is because 'it is against the policy of the law to 
create new proprietary interests". The point is that the licensee is not 
paying for individual "activity rights', but for rights in respect of a 
specific parcel of neighbouring land. A Coasian bargaining solution of 
even quite simple nuisance problems could involve an immensely 
complicated set of property rights in land.
The difficulties arising from a 'direct interaction' analysis of the 
kind put forward by Coase, may be remedied by considering the problem in 
terms of both private and common property. By virtue of acquiring private 
property rights in neighbouring blocks of land, individuals acquire 
rights in various common property assets. A very simple example is the 
boundary fence between suburban houses. This is, in effect, the common 
property of two neighbours, and each is under an obligation to contribute 
to the cost of reasonable repairs made by the other. In this case, since 
no other parties are even potentially involved, Coasian bargaining 
between the parties is quite possible, and appears to take place in 
practice. For example, individuals with a low demand for privacy and a
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high demand for leisure can agree to leave a fence in a state of 
disrepair.
Other common property assets involve a larger group of owners and
more complex obligations. The most important for cases of nuisance is the
atmosphere, which carries such things as smoke, smells and noise. The
number of co-owners here is not confined to immediately adjacent 
15occupiers. Thus, Coasian bargaining is not likely to be practical in 
this case.
Because of his direct interaction framework, Coase does not observe 
this. Indeed, in one of the cases he quotes, the judge draws the relevant 
distinction, but Coase ignores it. In the case of Bass v. Gregory (1890), 
a public house had for some years brewed beer in a cellar, which was 
ventilated through a shaft which opened into a well in a neighbouring 
property. The owner of the property blocked the well, and the brewers 
sought an injunction to have it unstopped. In a previous case, that of 
Bryant v. Lefever, it had been held that there was no general right to 
vent smoke etc. onto neighbouring properties. Thus, (op. cit. p.ll)
'The court had first to determine whether the owners of the public 
house could have a legal right to a current of air. If they were to 
have such a right, this case would have to be distinguished from 
Bryant v. Lefever. This, however, presented no difficulty. In this 
case, the current of air was confined to 'a strictly defined 
channel'. In the case of Bryant v. Lefever, what was involved was 
'the general current of air common to all mankind'. The judge, 
therefore, held that the owners of the public house could have the 
right to a current of air, whereas the owner of the private house in 
Bryant v. Lefever could not.'
Coase comments 'an economist might be tempted to add 'but the air 
moved all the same'.' He further adds that, in deciding the economically 
desirable allocation of rights such questions are 'about as relevant as
^  It is, however, finite, both because of physical limits on the 
propogation of, say, noise, and because very widespread nuisance, would 
be dealt with under the criminal law of public nuisance.
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the colour of the judge’s eyes'. Because of his ’activity rights' 
framework, Coase fails to see that rights over a particular current of 
air confined to two neighbouring properties are entirely different to 
rights over 8 the general current of air common to all mankind', in both 
their economic and legal implications.
In the case of the individual air current, Coasian bargaining between 
the two affected parties will ensure an optimal allocation of resources. 
In the case of the atmosphere which is common to all, no such bargaining 
is possible, and the decisions of judges and legislators represent a 
final determination of use. Thus, like many other users of the concept of 
'transaction costs', Coase fails to analyse the factors which make these 
costs small or prohibitively large. This would not matter, if, as he 
asserts, judges tend to make decisions which allocate land to its most 
productive use.
In order to support this claim, Coase refers to a number of cases 
which establish the doctrine of a 'local standard of comfort' i.e. that 
the level of personal discomfort which constitutes a nuisance depends on 
the general amenity of the neighbourhood. Since the lower the general 
level of amenity, the higher would be the cost of imposing a given 
standard, this form of 'court-ordered zoning' tends to favour the more 
economically productive uses of land.
However, Coase fails to observe that this principle is strictly 
limited to questions of personal discomfort. In cases where there is 
actual financial loss arising from a nuisance, no such considerations 
apply. Indeed, Heuston (op. cit. p.60) explicitly rejects Coase's main 
argument saying 'no consideration of public utility can be suffered to 
deprive an individual of his legal rights without compensation'.
The main problem with Coase's claim is that discussed in Section 1.3. 
A policy of allocating property rights so as to favour the form of land 
use which is currently most productive is inconsistent with the 
requirement for stability in the property rights structure. The problems 
of an excessively rigid structure of rights, implied by the rejection of 
any test of public utility, are met in two ways - the possibility of
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substituting damages for injunctions, and the power of the legislature to 
alter the allocation of rights.
As well as rejecting the defence of public utility for a nuisance, 
the case of Shelter v. The City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895) 
laid down the principle that damages could be paid, in lieu of an 
injunction, where the plaintiff's loss was small and could be compensated 
by a money payment while an injunction would be 'oppressive' to the 
defendant. As noted above, Coase's analysis of the question of 
compensation was defective, and for this reason he paid little attention 
to the distinction between damages and injunctive remedies.
Coase recognises the possibility of government intervention to change 
the structure of rights, and, indeed, points out that this may have 
legalised many acts which would otherwise consitute a nuisance and have 
been widely regarded as examples of market failure, e.g. airports and the 
associated noise. As he points out, such intervention may improve the 
allocation of resources.
Indeed, where the numbers (potentially) involved are so large as to 
prevent a negotiated solution, and the costs and benefits of a proposed 
alterations in rights are both large, the decision (or lack of it) is 
inevitably one for government. This should not, however, prevent the 
payment of compensation to those whose rights are disturbed. As noted 
above, such compensation will assist both in the attainment of (static) 
efficiency in resource use, and in the maintenance of a stable system of 
rights.
In summary, the legal cases cited by Coase are not consistent with a 
pure 'activity rights' framework and are better interpreted as regulating 
the use of various forms of common property arising from the ownership of 
neighbouring blocks of land. Only in cases where the number of common 
owners (as distinct from the parties actually involved in a particular 
dispute) is small, will Coasian bargaining yield an optimal allocation 
regardless of the legal allocation of rights. Since the function of the 
courts is to uphold the stability of rights, substantial changes in the 
use of common property can only be brought about by legislative action. 
Such action may either lay down changes in the rights to use common
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property, or it may allow a group of common owners to make such changes, 
replacing the common law unanimity rule with some form of majority vote.
2.6 The Knightian Approach
The debate over the economics of the environment has been dominated 
by the Pigo vian and Coasian schools. Alternative views have been 
expressed, however, and one of the most important will be considered 
here. Mohring and Boyd (1971, hereafter MB) criticised both Coase and 
Pigou. They described the previous approaches as 'direct interaction' 
frameworks in contrast to the 'asset utilisation' framework they 
advocated. The present work owes a significant debt to MB, since the 
common property approach is also based on analysis of asset utilisation. 
The main point of divergence is that the MB analysis is based on 
(competitive) profit maximisation by a private owner, rather than on 
maximising the welfare of a group of users. This approach leads them into 
a number of errors and contradictions.
The main analysis put forward by MB focuses on two examples of 
pollution problems, a lake and a river. In the following discussion their 
analysis will be simplified to eliminate some non-essential features. In 
the first problem, they consider a lake which is used by a number of 
firms as both a repository for wastes (denoted Z^ ) and as an input in 
the production process, with a value depending on water quality 
In combination with variable inputs Xi purchased in competitive markets 
at a wage W^, this yields outputs Y* which are sold (in competitive 
markets) at a price P*. As in the analysis of section 1.5, each firm's 
impact on water quality is assumed to be small, so that, in particular, 
is treated as an exogenous parameter by firm i.
MB then suggest that 'a reasonable social goal would be to maximise 
the difference between the value of output, ZP^Y^ and the cost of X 
inputs, ZVTx^, for the n firms'. From a common property viewpoint 
this suggestion is unexceptionable, except for the possibility of
MB allow the quality to be different for each user, since this is 
necessary in their next problem. This possibility may be incorporated in 
the analysis of section 1.5 by allowing Q to be an n-dimensional vector.
4 3 .
potential users who are deterred completely by the present level of 
pollution. However, MB do not stop to consider whether this social goal 
is equivalent to profit maximisation by a competitive owner. As has been 
observed, this is a very thorny question.
The following marginal conditions are derived for i=l,2...n:
(2.6.1) P 9Y1/9Xi - wi = 0
and
(2.6.2) P. 3Y1/9Z. + I. P. 3y V3Q- Q./9z . = 0 .l i 3 3 3 3 i
MB go on to recommend a charge equal to the second term in (2.6.2) 
per unit of waste disposed of by firm i. This is essentially what would 
be obtained from a Pigo /ian analysis.
The second example concerns a river, and is distinguished by the fact 
that the water quality available to firm i depends only on the emissions 
of firms located upstream. For simplicity the firms may be ordered, so 
that firm 1 is furthest upstream, and firm n is at the mouth of the river 
where its waste is of no concern. Then, as MB point out, (2.6.2) may be 
specialised so that the summation in the second term is taken over j>i.
In particular, they point out that no charge should be levied on firm n.
So far, so good. The problems arise when MB consider the 
establishment of a (non-polluting) bathing beach, which may be placed 
either at site 0, immediately upstream of firm 1 or at site (n+1), 
immediately downstream of firm n. Now, they argue from (2.6.2), the first 
choice would involve no additional charges on the existing firms, whereas 
the second would add a term of the form
(2.6.3) Pn+1 O Y n+1/9Qn+1) (9Qn+1/9Z.)
to the charges levied on firm i, and the imposition of this levy would 
reduce the net output of these firms. MB continue:
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"In brief, under this set of operating rules., choice of site 0 
for the beach would not change the contributions of firms l,...n to 
'social welfare'; choice of site (n+1) would lead to a reduction in 
this contribution. Maximising welfare would require that this fact be 
taken into account in the bathing-beach entrepreneur's locational 
decision. This could be done by making it known that use of site 
(n+1) for a bathing beach would result in the imposition of a 
franchise tax equal to the difference between the socially optimum 
values of (PiYi “ WiXi^  and without the beach.'
Unfortunately, this suggestion is completely inconsistent with all 
the analysis that has preceded it. It contradicts the suggestion that 
river firm n should pay no charges, since the levies on firms 1 to (n-1) 
for damage to n reduce their output. A particularly telling example of 
this is the case where firms 1 and n operate bathing beaches, and we are 
considering which of them should close down. This is the precise obverse 
of the problem considered above, but the MB solution does not involve a 
levy on firm n.
More generally, any of the firms in the lake example are free to 
reduce the amount of pollution damage they incur, either by changing 
their input mix or by shutting down altogether. This action would reduce 
the charges on other firms and increase their net output. Thus, MB's 
analysis of the bathing-beach problem would imply that all firms should 
pay charges in their capacity as victim, as well as in their capacity as 
polluters. This, of course, would be inconsistent with the maximisation 
conditions (2.6.2).
From a common-property perspective, it is fairly easy to detect the 
error in MB's analysis. The appropriate charge on firms 1 to n should 
represent the loss of asset value to the bathing beach firm, and the same 
charge should be levied regardless of the firm's siting decision. If, at 
the base level of pollution activity site 0 is preferred, it will always 
be adopted and no charge should be imposed. If site (n+1) is preferred at 
the base level, a pollution charge should always be imposed. Two 
possibilities arise. First, the polluting activities of firms 1 to n may 
induce the bathing beach to relocate at 0. In this case the appropriate 
charge is the difference in value between sites 0 and (n+1).
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Alternatively, the bathing beach may remain at (n+1) and suffer pollution 
damage. In this case, the firms must be charged in accordance with the 
reduction in value of the bathing beach, as compared with the base 
situation. This charge will, of course, be less than the difference in 
value between 0 and (n+1) since otherwise the beach would have been 
relocated to 0.
The 'profit-maximising' framework adopted by MB predisposes them to 
errors of this kind. As has been observed above, no profit-maximising 
asset owner will consider the interests of asset users who are not 
subject to any charge. Thus, it is not surprising that, when MB attempt 
to formulate criteria which do take account of such users, their 
analytical framework does not give them much assistance.
2.7 The Theory of Clubs
Like the Mohring-Boyd asset-utilisation framework, the theory of 
clubs can be traced back to the work of Knight (1924). However, in its 
development by Buchanan (1965) and subsequent writers, the theory of 
clubs has diverged significantly from the Mohring-Boyd approach. Thus, it 
has a different focus from the theories discussed previously, and is 
generally associated with public good problems rather than 
'externalities'.
In many ways, the common property analysis stands midway between the 
Mohring-Boyd analysis and the theory of clubs. In particular, like club 
theory, its dominant concern is with the group of users of an asset. 
However, there are significant differences between the two approaches, 
reflecting the rather different problems with which they are concerned. A 
debate within the theory of clubs itself serves to illustrate some of 
these distinctions.
Buchanan (1965) considered the formation of a club, made up of 
identical individuals, who would collectively purchase and use an 
'impure' public good, from which non-members were excluded. The utility 
of the public good to each club member declined as the number of members 
increased, and ultimately this crowding effect outweighed the benefits of 
further cost-sharing. Buchanan derived conditions for the membership
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level which would maximise the utility of the representative club member. 
Ng (1973) criticised this view. He argued that Buchanan's solution 
represented a market equilibrium, since at this point the club would not 
accept new members, but did not represent a Pareto-optimum, since the 
interests of non-members were not taken into account. Helpman and Hillman 
(1977) resolved this conflict, pointing out that Ng and Buchanan were 
examining different problems. Buchanan's analysis implicitly assumes that 
a large number of clubs may be formed to consume identical goods, whereas 
Ng's analysis assumes one club per good. Since the theory of clubs is 
typically concerned with produced public goods, Buchanan's approach is 
more appropriate and it is followed by the mainstream of the literature 
on clubs. However, the common property analysis, is mainly concerned with 
unique fixed assets, such as lakes and air-basins, and is therefore 
closer to Ng on this point.
This is not to say that a common property approach cannot be applied 
to problems involving produced goods. This can be done by including 
activities which improve asset quality and are therefore 'productive'. By 
making the number of productive activities sufficiently large, and the 
'quality' vector sufficiently complex, it would even be possible to 
produce a model of the Buchanan type in which many groups of users 
consume essentially similar goods. Indeed, Ng (1977) suggests this 
possibility in an attempt to refute Helpman and Hillman's description of 
his approach as a 'one-club model'. However, this added complexity would 
make the model very unwieldy, without giving any improvement in 
explanatory power over the simple Buchanan model.
A related problem raised in this debate, and elsewhere in the club 
literature is that of discreteness. The basic club theory analysis is 
essentially discrete; an individual is either in the club or out of it. 
This naturally creates problems in the use of calculus, and particularly 
in marginal analysis i.e. considering decisions on whether marginal 
individuals should join the club. These problems do not usually arise in 
the common property analysis, because the group under consideration 
includes all potential users of the asset. Individuals' usage levels are 
normally assumed to vary continuously in response to changing 
circumstances. Of course, discreteness can be introduced by restricting 
the activity sets A^ to two points, representing membership and
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non-membership. Discreteness of a different kind may be introduced by the 
use of a two-part tariff to control usage levels. In problems of this 
kind, common property analysis and the theory of clubs may reach similar 
conclusions from different starting-points. Generally, though, the common 
property approach is concerned with continuous variables representing 
asset usage and quality rather than with discrete variables such as club 
membership.
To illustrate the relationship between the common property approach 
and the theory of clubs, it is useful to consider the example of road 
usage, first debated by Knight and Pigou. We may first consider the case 
of a single road, with no economical possibilities for upgrading. In 
terms of the theory of clubs, this corresponds to the Ng model, rather 
than that of Buchanan. Comparison with the existing literature will be 
facilitated by assuming each (potential) road user to have only two 
discrete options, using the road or not using it. This assumption means 
that the calculus approach used to obtain (1.7.8) is no longer 
applicable. Instead, let us order the asset users in terms of the benefit 
they obtain from using the asset, so that individual 1 obtains the 
greatest benefit and individual n the least. (Assume, for simplicity, 
that this ordering is unaffected by changes in asset quality). The 
optimal usage pattern may be determined recursively, beginning from a 
situation where individual 1 is the sole asset user. Whether individual j 
should be added to the set of asset users depends on whether or not
(2.7.1) v . (l,q(j)) - Zi<j 3v./3q 3q/3a
where 0 and 1 correspond to using the asset or not using it respectively, 
the asset usage level a is set equal to the number of users, and it is 
assumed that
(2.7.2) V^(0,q) = 0 for all i,q.
A similar formula is derived by Ng.
The Buchanan approach would apply if the road could be duplicated as 
many times as necessary, and the carrying capacity increased linearly 
with the number of lanes. If all individuals were equally sensitive to
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congestion, then there will be a fixed optimal number of users determined 
when congestion effects outweigh the benefits derived from spreading the 
costs of construction. If the sensitivity to congestion differs between 
individuals, the Buchanan approach would yield a 'discriminating' 
solution. 'Sensitive' users would choose low density, high cost per user 
roads (e.g. toll expressways), while others would use cheaper, more 
crowded roads. This last case is related to that examined by Tiebout 
(1956), in the context of local government.
In general, the assumption of a linear increase in carrying capacity 
is unrealistic. Because of opportunities for overtaking, the capacity of 
a road will normally increase more rapidly than the number of lanes. It 
is largely for this reason that discriminating systems of the type 
described above are rarely seen in practice, except where the high and 
low cost roads follow different routes for technical reasons e.g. where 
advances in technology make the construction of a more direct road 
feasible.
As was noted above, the latter situation may be handled within the 
common property approach by allowing two activities, road use and road 
construction. The optimal level of road usage will once again be 
determined by (2.7.1). If we denote the level of construction activity by 
a2 and the cost of construction by C(a2), the optimal level of 
construction activity is given by
(2.7.3) 9q/9a2 = 9C/9a2
That is, the marginal cost of additional road construction must equal 
the marginal increse in the value of the asset to existing and potential 
road users.
This analysis also applies to the case where the number of lanes is 
fixed, but road quality can be altered by 'upgrading' expenditure of 
various kinds.
Thus, for most road problems, where the number of separate roads to 
be considered is small, a common property analysis would appear 
preferable to that yielded by the mainstream club theory approach.
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Chapter 3
PRICING, ASSET USAGE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Introduction
As can be seen from the previous two chapters, the question of 
pricing systems is central to the 'externalities' debate. This question 
may be broken down into two parts - the determination of an 'optimal' 
pricing scheme (if one exists), and the analysis and assessment of the 
pricing structures arising from different possible institutional 
arrangements.
According to Demsetz' (1969) 'comparative institutions' approach, 
only the second part of this analytic effort is useful. Demsetz strongly 
criticises what he calls the 'nirvana' approach - analysis which 
describes institutions as 'inefficient' if they do not yield an optimal 
allocation of resources. His main concern is with the case when market 
institutions are found to be inefficient and government intervention is 
suggested to correct this.
While Demsetz is correct in saying that inefficiencies in market 
institutions do not automatically justify government intervention, his 
methodological case for rejecting absolute efficiency criteria is 
unsound. It is useful to consider an analogy with engineering, where the 
efficiency with which an engine converts input energy into useful work is 
a question of major importance. The appropriate analogue of Demsetz' 
approach would be one in which any consideration of the theoretical 
limits on engine performance is set aside, and analysis is confined to 
comparing the actual performance of different engines. Such an approach 
would be extremely unhelpful in the design of new engines, since there 
would be no way of determining where there was room for improvement in 
current designs, and where they were already performing at or near the 
theoretical limit.
Similarly, the power of economic analysis would be greatly weakened 
if absolute yardsticks of efficiency and optimality were discarded in 
favour of purely relative comparisons between institutions. Consider the
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example, raised by Demsetz himself, of free trade and protection. Suppose 
that we adopt a 'conservative' objective of maximising national income, 
subject to the requirement that any change from the existing position be 
a Pareto-improvement. Under the usual neoclassical assumptions, economic 
analysis can demonstrate that this is impossible under free trade, but 
that it may be possible under protection since the latter policy is 
'inefficient' i.e. there exists a set of prices and initial asset 
endowment which would be Pareto-superior. However, it is extremely 
difficult to exhibit a feasible set of institutions which will yield such 
a Pareto-improvement from an initial situation of protection. Free trade 
will almost always involve some windfall losses, and 'lump-sum' 
compensation will have to be financed by distorting taxes.
Until such an institution can be presented, a user of the comparative 
institutions approach cannot draw any distinction between the two initial 
situations of free trade and protection. By contrast a user of the 
'nirvana' approach can say that free trade is absolutely efficient (i.e. 
has attained nirvana), since no alternative policy can achieve an 
improvement under the conservative criterion described above. Protection 
is not efficient in this sense, and this justifies the consideration of 
alternative policies.
In this chapter, a 'nirvana' approach will be adopted. Consideration 
will first be given to determining the conditions for schemes of pricing 
(and alternatives such as regulation) which yield an optimal pattern of 
asset usage, and then to the likely performance of a range of possible 
institutions.
3.2 Damage Schedules and Pigouvian Taxes
A number of difficulties with the Pigouvian 'externality' analysis 
were discussed in the previous chapter. Many of these difficulties arose 
from a tendency to measure external costs on the assumption of an 
unchanged activity level by victims of pollution. This analytical error 
does not, of itself, invalidate the Pigo vian policy recommendation that 
polluters should be levied at a rate equal to the marginal external costs 
they generate, but it makes evaluation of the recommendation more 
difficult.
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The analytical framework set out in sections 1.6 and 1.7 makes it 
possible to determine marginal and total damage schedules for the effects 
of polluters' activities, without necessarily assuming that victims 
cannot adjust their activities. This framework therefore permits a more 
rigorous evaluation of the Pigo vian policy recommendation.
The simplest case is that of a single polluter, with a number of 
victims whose activities do not impinge on the polluter. In the special 
case of 'passive' victims who are constrained to adopt the base activity, 
equation (1.5.7) gives a total damage level of
(3.2.1) C = - vj (a_.°, q)
for pollution by individual i. This yields the marginal damage schedule 
(3.2.2) c = 9C/9a^ = -
In this case, it is easy to see the rationale for the familiar Pigouvian 
recommendation that the (marginal) charge for pollution should be equal 
to the marginal external cost. However (3.2.1) indicates that, if global 
optimisation is to be guaranteed, the total damage level will not 
normally be equal to the revenue generated by a Pigouvian tax on the 
relevant activity levied at the marginal rate. This will only occur if 
the 'total damage function' C is linear, so that c is a constant.
The consequences of this may be observed more easily if the polluter 
is assumed to be a firm, a^ its production level, and the base level 
a,^ to be zero. If C is convex in a., a flat-rate Pigo vian tax on 
activity will 'overcharge' the firm and may lead to production being 
abandoned when it should go ahead. Conversely, if C is concave, an 
undesirable activity may proceed. The most extreme case is where the 
marginal damage becomes zero after a certain point. This is the 
'inframarginal externality' of Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962).17
1 7 Note that nothing except income distribution is affected if the base 
level is altered. If the polluter operates below the base level, the LHS 
of (3.2.1) becomes negative i.e. the polluter receives compensation 
similar to Coasian 'bribes'. This point is essentially equivalent to the 
Coase's well-known theorem.
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The passivity assumption may be relaxed and the group of victims 
allowed to adjust. On the assumption that the base level of usage 
represents an initial optimum (i.e. an optimum in the zero pollution 
situation) the total damage schedule yielded by (1.5.15) is
(3.2.3) C = min (- (a2....an))
In the case where none of the victims' activities affect asset 
quality, (3.2.3) yields
(3.2.4) C = - 1.^. V. (q)
and
(3.2.5) 9C/9a, ~ 3Vj/9q 3q/9a^.
These conditions differ from (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) in that , the
asset value at the base level of activity a^°, is replaced by the maximum
asset value V^. This does not invalidate the Pigouvian recommendation
of a tax equal to marginal damage, since at the optimum activity level 
*a.(q) we have 3
(3.2.6) 9V./9a.3 3
and hence
(3.2.7) 9Vj/9q = 9/3q v^  (a*,q).
*The fact that a varies with q does, however create some additional 
problems for analysis using the Pigo vian approach. It means that the 
total damage schedule (3.2.4) cannot be obtained simply by integrating
(3.2.7) with respect to q. Thus, a flat-rate tax may be inappropriate 
even if (3.2.7) is a linear function. Consider, for example, the problem 
of beach pollution, referred to above. If pollution is so bad as to 
reduce usage to zero, then the marginal damage given by (3.2.7) will be 
identically zero but this will not give any information about the total 
damage level.
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Further problems arise when there is more than one polluter. In this 
case, not only must victims adjust their non-polluting activities to 
reduce the damage they incur individually but an increase in polluting 
activity by one individual will alter the optimal level of polluting 
activity for the others. These effects may be illustrated most easily for 
a two-polluter case, where individuals 1 and 2 are polluters and a^ 
represents the level of polluting activity as before, so that
(3.2.8) a = a1 + a2
The marginal damage schedule for pollution by individual 1 is given by
(3.2.9) 3C1/3a1 = Z_j >3 3V_./3q 3q/3a 3a/3a1 - 3V2/3a2 (1- a/ a ^  .
This marginal damage schedule may be integrated with respect to a^ 
to yield a total damage schedule for individual 1, and a similar process 
may be undertaken for individual 2. It would seem natural to add these 
schedules together, to produce a schedule of total damage for the two 
polluters combined. Unfortunately, this cannot, in general, be done. 
Consider once again the case of an 'inframarginal' externality, in which 
the marginal damage to all victims is zero after a certain point, and 
suppose that the optimal quality level is beyond this point in all cases. 
That is, for both of the groups consisting of only one polluter and all
the victims (i.e. groups (l,3....n) and 2.... n), the quality level at
which total asset value is maximised is beyond the critical level q. Then 
the total and marginal damage schedule for each polluter, considered 
singly, are identically equal to zero. However, the two polluters, 
considered together, do impose positive damage on the remaining users. It 
may be noted that the assumptions of the case mean that a zero polluter 
charge will yield a value-maximising use of the resource. However, as
(3.2.9) shows, it is necessary to have information about the 
profitability of the 'polluters', as well as the marginal damage schedule 
for 'victims' alone in order to arrive at this result. This issue will be 
considered in more detail in the following section.
The major issue of interest in this section is the relationship 
between the individuals polluters' damage schedules and the collective 
damage schedule for the polluters as a group. For the sake of simplicity,
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a two-polluter case will be considered. The collective damage schedule 
for individuals 1 and 2 may be written C12(a), or more explicitly,
Cl2 (ai'*’a2) * The mar9inal schedule is simply
(3.2.10) 9C12/8a = - Zj>3 3v../3q 3q/3a
It is fairly easy to see that equality between C +C2 and C12 
will hold if the marginal damage schedule (3.2.10) is constant. In this 
case, the optimal activity level for each polluter is independent of 
asset quality and hence of the activities of the other polluter. Thus, 
the second term in the RHS of (3.2.9) is zero for both individuals, and 
the constancy of 3V./9q yields the desired result. More generally,
C^2 will be less than Cj^ +C2 if V is convex in q, and greater if V 
is concave. This result will not be proved here, but the basic reasoning 
is as follows.
If V is convex, then each polluter will impose external costs upon 
the other, by increasing the cost of asset usage and reducing the optimal 
level of activity. Conversely, if V is concave, the polluters will 
generate external economies for each other. The latter case is 
reminiscent of the case of external size economies.
A limiting case of significant interest arises, when there are many 
polluters, each of whom has only a 'small' effect on asset quality. In 
many cases of this kind, such as congestion problems, the distinction 
between 'polluters' and 'victims' breaks down. Since each individual's 
contribution is small, the sensitivity of other individuals to changes in 
asset quality will be almost independent of the activity level of 
individual i. Hence, the marginal damage schedule for individual i will 
be constant. Moreover, it will be possible to combine the damage 
schedules for groups of polluters, provided their total impact is still 
small. For larger groups, the questions of concavity and convexity will 
aPPly as before.
Thus, examination of the marginal and total damage schedules yielded 
by a common property analysis reveals significant difficulties for the 
Pigo vian tax policy. In the following section, alternative pricing 
policies are considered.
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3.3 Pricing, Information and Resource Allocation
The analytical framework associated with the common property approach 
has been used above to determine optimal usage conditions for a common 
property assets. One method of achieving optimal resource use would be to 
assign compulsory usage levels in accordance with these optimal 
conditions. This method was used quite successfully by many traditional 
common property institutions, such as the open field system discussed 
below. However, it generally requires relatively static technology and 
tastes, and a well-informed assigning authority. These were features of 
many traditional common property institutions, but are less applicable to 
modern pollution problems. For this reason, it is desirable to examine 
price mechanisms, which can respond flexibly to changing situations.
Price systems may be viewed in a number of ways. In economic analysis 
the most common concern is with their function as signals, determining 
the allocation of resources while minimising the information requirements 
of decision-makers. Businessmen, on the other hand, are more typically 
concerned with the degree to which the price they charge will 'cover 
costs'.
Three important issues may be distinguished here. They are:
(i) how close is the use of resources yielded by a particular pricing 
system to the optimal or 'nirvana' allocation?
(ii) how much information is required to set the prices?
(iii) to what extent does the price charged to each individual or group 
of individuals reflect the costs they impose on other asset users?
These issues are fairly simple in the one polluter case. Let a^* be 
the optimal level of polluting activity as determined by (1.7.13), and 
let C(a^) be the damage schedule of (3.2.1). Then it is reasonable to 
suppose
(3.3.1) 3v^/3a  ^> Sc/Sa.^  for a^ < a^*
3v1/9a1 3C/3a1 a^  ^ a1*,
at least in a neighbourhood of a^*#
56.
As has been noted above, efficiency will normally require a schedule 
of charges rather than a single fixed price. We may write the total price 
charged for activity level a^ as P(a1) and the marginal rate as 
p(a^). Then a sufficient condition that the level of pollution will not 
be too great is
(3.3.2) p(a^) > SC/Sa^^ for all a^r 
since, by (3.3.1), this means that
(3.3.3) p(a^) > for ai ^ ai*
A sufficient condition for the level of pollution not to be smaller 
than the optimal level a^* is given by the converse of (3.3.3),
(3.3.4) p(a1) < 3v1/3a1 for a1 < a^* .
There are a range of possible pricing schemes which will satisfy both
(3.3.2) and (3.3.4), and hence will yield the optimal allocation of 
resources. The lowest such charge is given by:
TOTAL DAMAGE RULE: Charge the polluter an amount equal to the total 
social damage i.e. the loss in asset value to all other users associated 
with his/her move away from the base level of activity.
This rule equates P(a^) with C(a^) and replaces the inequality in
(3.3.2) with an equality. If, instead, equality is imposed in (3.3.4), we 
obtain:
TOTAL SURPLUS RULE: Charge the polluter at a marginal rate equal to the 
greater of the marginal private benefit and the marginal social cost.
This rule yields a total charge given by
= v1(a 1 ) a ± a x*
v1 (a1*) + C(a1)-C(a1*) a± > a±*
(3.3.5) P(ax)
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Any pricing schedule lying between the two just described will also
★yield the optimal allocation a . It is also apparent that any such 
schedule will satisfy the 'cost-covering' requirement, since the total 
damage rule does so.
The minimal information required by all the rules described above is 
the victim's marginal damage schedule. The total damage rule uses this 
information only, while all other rules require information on private 
benefits to the polluter. Thus, the total damage rule best fulfils the 
criteria set out above, although other rules may still be preferred, 
perhaps on distributional grounds.
As was pointed out in section 3.2, the Pigouvian policy of setting a 
tax equal to the marginal damage level at the optimum may not yield an 
efficient allocation of resources. If the damage schedule is convex, the 
Pigouvian tax may exceed the total surplus so that the polluting activity 
is not undertaken even though there are positive net benefits. If the 
schedule is concave, the Pigouvian tax will be less than the total 
damage, and undesirable activities may proceed.
The Pigouvian tax approach also faces significant information 
difficulties. The optimal pollution level can only be determined in 
advance if information is possessed on both the surplus accruing to
polluters, and the damage suffered by victims. Attempts to avoid this
difficulty by altering charges on an iterative basis seem to create as 
many difficulties as they resolve (Baumöl and Oates 1975, pp.78-79).
The formal analysis above carries over quite straightforwardly to the 
multiple polluter case. The inequalities (3.3.1-4) hold for each polluter 
i, and the total damage and total surplus rules once again bound the set
of pricing schedules which guarantee an optimum pattern of asset usage.
However, the analysis of information requirements and cost-covering must 
be modified to a significant extent. For example, determining C(a^) for 
a polluter i requires knowledge of the reduction in asset value to the 
other users considered as a group. However, this group includes not only 
'victims' but other polluters who must reduce their own levels of 
polluting activity in response to that of individual i. Thus, 
determination of an efficient pricing system requires information on the
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cost/benefit functions of all asset users, polluters and victims 
alike.
As was shown in the previous section, the fact that a pricing 
schedule covers the costs imposed by a single polluter does not mean that 
it will cover the costs generated collectively by two or more polluters. 
In fact, we may observe that application of the total damage rule to each 
individual polluter will cover the collective costs of pollution only if 
the relevant damage schedules are linear or convex. On the other hand, 
use of the total surplus rule will always cover all costs. This is 
because, in order for more than zero pollution to be optimal, the total 
surplus accruing to the polluters must exceed the costs they impose on 
other asset users.
3.4 Private Ownership and Competitive Pricing
The establishment of private ownership rights has been the main 
policy proposal associated with standard economic analyses of so-called 
'common property' problems. In the more general debate over 
'externalities', the question of when private ownership provides an 
appropriate institutional framework has been argued at length without a 
satisfactory resolution. In particular, the distinction between 
depletable and undepletable externalities, put forward by Baumöl and 
Oates (1975) has been shown to provide an inadequate basis for 
determining this issue.
Two forms of private ownership rights were discussed in the previous 
chapter - the 'Coasian' rights to engage in a particular activity, and 
the 'Knightian' rights associated with particular assets. As has been 
argued above, when Coasian rights do exist, they are normally associated 
with a common property asset and are better discussed in terms of that 
asset. For this reason, the present section will deal only with the 
Knightian recommendation of private ownership and control over the asset 
in question. This recommendation has been repeated in general by writers
1 ft This is not strictly correct. If information is available for all 
but one polluter, it would be possible to apply the Total Damage Rule to 
that one and the Total Surplus Rule to all the others.
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such as Mohring and Boyd (1974), and in specific cases by Scott (1955) 
and others.
In order to develop a discussion of the conditions under which 
private ownership will achieve optimal asset usage, it will be useful to 
review some of the examples (and counter-examples) presented in section 
2.3. The fisheries example, taken from Baumöl and Oates, is easy to 
explain in the light of the results of section 3.2. In this example all 
of the surplus arising from the existence of the asset accrues to the 
owner. By charging profit-maximising prices, the owner is, in effect, 
implementing the total surplus rule described in the previous section.
The question of depletability may fairly be described as a red herring.
A question of rather more interest is: why does the total surplus 
accrue to the asset owner? The reason is that both the inputs 
(fisherman's labour) and the outputs (fish) associated with the 
asset-using activity are available, in perfectly elastic supply, at 
competitively determined prices. Hence, the benefits and opportunity 
costs associated with using the lake are the same for each fisherman, and 
will be equilibrated to the price charged by the owner. Reasoning similar 
to this underlies the Knightian argument elaborated by Mohring and Boyd. 
The crucial assumption is that the benefit yielded by the asset is the 
same for all individuals undertaking the activity.
In the second Baumol-Oates example, that of the flower gardens, 
benefits of using the asset vary between individuals. If, by chance, the 
benefit of viewing a particular garden was the same for all individuals, 
then a charge equal to this benefit would maximise profits and satisfy 
the total surplus rule. This charge would yield efficiency in both 
production and consumption, since there would be an adequate incentive to 
supply enough gardens to meet the viewing demand.
The above framework of analysis may be related to the analysis of the 
private supply of public goods put forward by Demsetz (1970) and Oakland 
(1974), among others. The work of these writers may be viewed as an 
attempt to discover ways in which the consumer surplus associated with 
public goods may be appropriated by the producers of those goods. After 
examining a case of identical demand similar to that which has just been
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discussed, Demsetz pointed out that this result could be generalised if 
the supplier was able to practice price discrimination between consumers. 
Unfortunately, as noted in section 3.2, the information requirements of 
this solution are very stringent, as are the difficulties of preventing 
'resale' transactions between users. For this reason, price 
discrimination is not very common in practice.
Oakland presents a model in which firms charge different prices for 
similar goods, securing some of the consumer surplus associated with 
public goods without substantial information requirements. However, since 
some consumers are excluded from goods they could costlessly use, 
Oakland's solution does involve significant departures from efficiency in 
consumption as well as in production.
All of the counter-examples presented in section 2.3 involve the 
problem of unappropriated consumer surplus. However, the existence of 
such a surplus does not, in itself, mean that private ownership will be 
inefficient. What is important is whether the surplus accruing to the 
owner is substantially affected by changes in asset quality. A private 
owner will be indifferent to these effects, and, if they are significant, 
asset quality will normally be suboptimal and usage excessive.
As the fishing example showed, however, this effect may be countered
by monopoly effects which tend to limit usage and increase asset 
19quality. As was pointed out in the previous section, these monopoly 
effects will be unimportant provided the asset-owner faces a horizontal 
demand curve at the margin. Thus, it is possible to derive two conditions 
which together are sufficient for private ownership to yield an efficient 
pattern of asset usage.
Competitive pricing condition: In a neighbourhood of the private 
ownership useage pattern (a^ , a  ^ ... a^ ) the marginal value of 
asset usage, 3v^/3a^ is a constant, independent of i.
For a converse to this effect, see the analysis of Thompson (1968) 
in which monopsony effects lead to an overproduction of public goods.
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Linear damage condition: For each level of asset quality q, the loss of 
asset value compared to the base quality level is represented by a linear 
function on the set of activities which is the same for all individuals.
The linear damage condition means that each of the individual asset 
value functions takes the form:
(3.4.1) vi (a.., q) = v. (a^ q°) - k(q) a., .
If the competitive pricing condition also holds, then in a neighbourhood 
of a^, , we may write:
(3.4.2) v^ (a^, q) = + (c-k(a)) ai ,
where c and z. are constants.l
The total value of the asset is:
(3.4.3) Ii vi (a^ q) = I Vi (aj/ q ) “ k(q) a
Zi Zi + (c “ k (q) > a
The optimisation conditions, which may be derived directly or from 
(1.5.8) are:
(3.4.4) c - k(q) = k'(q) 3q/3a
The price a private owner can charge any asset user is determined by 
(3.4.2) as c-k(q) so that total revenue is (c-k(q))a, and maximising this 
yields (3.4.4). The surplus left to each asset user is a constant z.,l
which is independent of asset quality and hence unaffected by the pricing 
decisions of the asset owner.
Some further comment is desirable on the relationship between the 
'competitive pricing condition' described above, and the Knightian 
assumption that the asset produces a good which can be sold in a 
perfectly competitive market. The Knightian assumption, which implies
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that all z^  = 0, means that private ownership will be efficient, 
whereas the 'competitive pricing condition' does not. The crucial 
difference arises from the assumption in the textbook definition of 
perfect competition, that all consumers are completely indifferent 
between suppliers of the good in question. For the competitive pricing 
condition to hold, indifference is required only at the margin, i.e. for 
marginal consumers and/or units of consumption. If this weaker condition 
holds, the firm will still behave precisely as would a textbook 
competitive firm, since the existence and level of the unappropriated 
consumer surpluses is entirely irrelevant to it.
This problem illustrates a significant difficulty with the well-known 
'instrumentalist' methodology of Friedman (1953). Friedman argues that 
the accuracy of predictions (in the area of interest), rather than the 
realism of assumptions should be the crucial test of an economic theory. 
In this case, the existence of 'inframarginal' consumer surpluses will 
have no effect on the accuracy of predictions as to pricing, firm size, 
industry structure, etc. However, the seemingly innocent assumption that 
there are no such surpluses can play a vital role in determining the 
validity of policy recommendations derived from the competitive model. In 
this case, at least, assumptions do matter.
Since 'inframarginal' surpluses of the kind discussed above do not 
affect the market behaviour of firms, they are likely to be revealed 
through 'political' processes of one kind or another. Asset users will 
seek either to modify decisions of asset owners which affect them 
adversely, or to remove the asset from private ownership. By contrast, in 
a perfectly competitive model, disgruntled asset users would simply take 
their custom elsewhere.
On the basis of the discussion above, it is possible to make some 
predictions as to the areas in which private ownership is likely to yield 
inefficient results. First, it is necessary that the asset in question 
should be unique or rare in some way, for example, with respect to 
geographical location. Second, inefficiency is more likely to arise in 
the case of consumption activities. Inefficiency with respect to 
productive activities is less likely, but is possible if there are 
factors of production which are specific to the asset in question. In the
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fisheries case, for example, fishermen might have specific 'local 
knowledge' of a particular lake, or they might be geographically immobile.
These predictions would appear to be borne out in practice. The main
areas of political concern over 'externalities' have involved unique
assets such as air basins and rivers, and it has been those involved in
'consumption' activities (breathing, drinking, recreation, etc) who have
20found market solutions unsatisfactory.
3.5 Pricing Decisions in Common Property Institutions
Economic analysis of decision-making has focused mainly on the 
decisions of individuals and entrepreneur-controlled firms. There is, 
however, a significant, though generally rather abstract, literature 
relating to collective decision-making procedures. Perhaps the most 
notable result in this area is Arrow's (1952) 'impossibility theorem'. 
Arrow's theorem showed that no 'well-behaved' collective decision-making 
procedure could work, unless the set of possible preference rankings of 
the individuals involved was restricted in some way.
A number of possible restrictions have been proposed. The most 
important for our purpose is the requirement, put forward by Sen (1966), 
that preferences be 'unimodal' or 'single-peaked'. Roughly speaking, this 
means that the available alternatives can be ordered on a one-dimensional 
scale, say from 'right' to 'left', in a way which is agreed by all 
voters. Each voter has a most preferred position on this scale and rates 
other alternatives according to how 'close' they are to this optimal 
position. Preferences of this kind make a consistent majority voting 
procedure possible. An example is the meeting procedure commonly adopted 
when there are a number of alternatives which can be ordered from 'left' 
to 'right'. This is to begin with one of the 'extreme' proposals and to 
proceed across the scale, until a proposal is found which obtains 
majority support as against the proposal next along the scale.
20 In some of these cases, private ownership is unsatisfactory because 
of monopoly effects. The larger is the unappropriated user surplus, the 
more likely it is that the competitive pricing equilibrium will be 
dominated by an 'inframarginal' monopoly equilibrium.
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In this section, consideration will be given to the question of a 
collective decision to determine an access price for use of a common 
property asset. In most circumstances this decision will satisfy Sen's 
unimodality requirement. An individual whose preferred price p* is lower 
than the price pq, may be expected to support a move from pQ to any 
'intermediate' price p , pQ < p^ < p*. Given this condition, 
majority voting will lead to the adopted price being that preferred by 
the median voter.
The situation is more complex where there are multiple uses for the 
asset, and hence more than one price to be set. In this case, it is quite 
possible for intransitivities of the kind considered by Arrow to arise. 
Consider, for example, a forest which may be either (A) cleared for 
farming, (B) selectively logged for forestry or (C) left untouched for 
recreational purposes. Clearly, both conservationists and foresters might 
prefer B to A, while both farmers and loggers would prefer A to C. 
However, if farmers are inconvenienced by logging operations, they might 
well join with conservationists in preferring C to B, so that majority 
votes could 'cycle' endlessly.
There are a number of possible solutions to this problem. First, it 
may be observed that, in practice, a uniform scaling of alternatives from 
'heavy use, high pollution' to 'low use, low pollution' works fairly well 
to describe most debates over the use of environmental assets. Second, 
there are possibilities of arriving at a firm decision through 
'logrolling' between different groups. These issues will not be 
considered further here. Instead, it will be assumed that the pricing 
preferences of the median voter prevails, and the efficiency of the 
resulting decisions will be assessed.
Consider the case of an asset used for a single activity. A usage 
charge is decided by majority vote, and the proceeds are divided equally 
among the group of asset owners. Thus, each voter must weigh the cost 
they will bear in usage charges against the benefits in improved asset 
quality and their share of the proceeds of the usage charge. It may be 
shown that majority voting will yield an optimal result provided the 
median voter is 'representative' i.e. provided the median levels of the 
relevant variables are equal to their means.
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Consider the decision problem of an individual voter, seeking to set 
a price which will maximise his/her benefit from the asset. Three factors 
must be taken into consideration:
(i) the cost of usage charges to the voter;
(ii) the share of revenue received by the voter (it is asumed that 
revenue is divided equally between voters); and
(iii) the effect on asset quality.
The voter must choose a price p, and an activity level a,, to solve 
the problem:
(3.5.1) Max V ^ (a^q) - pa^ + (pa)/n 
ai fP
The first order conditions are:
(3.5.2) 9v./9a. = p , 
and
(3.5.3) 9v^/3q 9q/9a 9a/3p - a^ + a/n + p/n 9a/9p = 0 .
The first condition simply determines the individual's usage level 
for given p. The second condition may be simplified for a 
'representative' voter for whom a^ is equal to a/n, yielding
(3.5.4) p = -n 3V./9q 3q/3a .
Again, for a 'representative' voter, the term in n may be replaced by 
a summation over all individuals to yield
(3.5.5) p = -(£. Vj/ 9q) 9q/9a
As is shown in section (3.2), this is the efficient uniform price, if 
one exists. Thus, as long as the median voter is 'representative' a 
majority voting system will yield an efficient pricing decision.
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A sufficient condition for the median of a random variable to equal 
the mean is that the distribution should be symmetric e.g. normal or 
uniform. This would appear to be a reasonable assumption, at least as a 
first approximation, where the variable of interest is determined by 
personal sensitivity to changes in asset quality. 'Psychological' 
variables of this kind are commonly represented by normal distributions.
Conversely, skewness in the distribution implies that the median will 
differ from the mean. A number of possible cases may be considered.
First, the distribution of 'sensitivity' variables may be truncated at 
zero (i.e. an individual indifferent to changes in asset quality), and, 
as a result, skewed somewhat to the left. In this case the distribution 
would contain a 'tail', consisting of highly sensitive individuals whose 
wishes will not be adequately taken into account.
The opposite possibility arises when there are a small number of 
'polluters' and a large number of victims. Because the voters will take 
into account the effects of pricing decisions on the total revenue from 
charges, they will act collectively in a manner similar to that of an 
individual monopolist (assuming, of course, that such a monopolist could 
appropriate the total surplus accruing to 'victims'). This problem could 
be remedied if the asset owners possessed sufficient information to apply 
the Total Surplus Rule to polluters (a discriminating monopoly solution). 
An alternative solution would arise if the relationship between price 
level and usage is determined in an 'almost competitive' fashion (compare 
2.3.8).
Thus, majority voting may lead to inefficient results unless the 
decisive median voter is 'typical'. In other cases, where a small number 
of individuals have a vital interest in the asset, while others are 
roughly indifferent, alternative possibilities must be considered.
Two main alternatives will be considered here. The first is to allow 
unequal weighting of votes, so that those individuals with a greater 
interest will have a larger say. In this way, the decisive voter will be 
close to the mean of the relevant distributions, and the analysis above 
will follow through. The second approach is to permit trading of votes. 
In the absence of transactions costs, a Coase-theorem analysis will
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apply, and the most concerned individuals will buy the votes of the 
others. Clearly, this will imply a final situation of unequal voting 
power even if the initial allocation is equal. In the Coasian 'no 
transactions costs' case, the initial allocation is relevant only on 
distributional grounds.
In practice, the two changes go together. While an unequal allocation 
of votes does not imply alienability of voting rights, the two are 
closely linked. For example, the widening of the electoral franchise in 
the nineteenth century went hand in hand with measures, such as secret 
ballots, aimed at preventing the sale of votes. One explanation for this 
is that unequal votes generally reflect allocations of other property 
rights, rather than inherent differences between individuals. Since 
property rights are normally tradeable, so are the privileges which 
attend them.
Since the median voter will never be exactly typical, it could be 
argued that votes should always be tradeable. On the whole, economists 
have been opposed to limitations on alienability (see e.g. Posner 1972). 
Inalienability rules have the obvious disadvantage of preventing mutually 
beneficial trades between consenting parties. However, in a collective 
choice framework, bargaining between voters involves substantial 
difficulties. Allowing the sale of voting rights increases the potential 
for rent-seeking activities aimed at creating a majority coalition. Such 
a coalition may adopt policies which confer benefits on its members, but 
impose heavy costs on those outside it. This, in turn, creates incentives 
to split the coalition and the potential for considerable costs arising 
from the decision-making process, as well as from the adoption of 
inefficient decisions.
This discussion may be put in the context of Arrow's 'impossibility' 
theorem. Permitting parties to make side payments greatly increases the 
range of possible outcomes from the voting process. This is likely to 
break down stability conditions, such as 'single-peakedness', which 
depend on restrictions on the set of outcomes.
Thus, the assumption that the median voter is representative need not 
be fulfilled exactly for simple majority voting to be preferable to
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alternative systems allowing transferable votes. Of course, if the 
assumption is not satisfied, majority voting will not yield an optimal 
allocation of resources. It may, however, come closer than any of the 
available alternatives, such as systems based on transferable votes or on 
sole private ownership.
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Chapter 4
APPLICATIONS OF THE COMMON PROPERTY APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have developed the concept of common property, both 
as an institutional framework and as a tool of analysis, and have 
contrasted it with competing paradigms. Applications of the theory have 
been dealt with in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, being used as 
illustrations of theoretical points rather than as problems of interest 
in their own right.
In this chapter, the focus is shifted onto a number of specific 
applications. First, the analysis of common property as an institutional 
framework is used as the basis for a discussion of recent work on an 
important common property institution - the medieval open field system.
In the following two sections, aspects of the salinity problems facing 
Australian agriculture are discussed, and some possible common property 
solutions are examined. Finally, the concept of common property is 
considered as a tool for the anlaysis of problems in relation to 
inventions, patenting and Plant Variety Rights.
Numerous other applications could be envisaged. A particularly 
interesting example would be the interaction of common and private 
property rights in the modern corporation. Another important area which 
has not been examined explicitly is that of multiple-use resources. The 
common property approach appears to offer significant advantages in 
analytic power in this area, as was shown in some of the examples in 
section 2.3. However, real-world applications will inevitably be 
complex, and require substantial empirical information on the shapes of 
damage schedules and other factors. It is hoped that the range of 
relatively simple applications contained in this chapter will give some 
measure of the scope and power of the concept of common property in 
economic analysis.
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4.2 The Open Field System - a Historical Example
Many of the widely held images of common property are derived from 
agriculture, and especially from the medieval open field system. This 
system was examined by Dahlman (1980), in what he claims to be 'the first 
truly intensive study of a particular economic institution from a 
property rights perspective' (op.cit., p.15). Dahlman finds it necessary 
to modify the standard property rights framework quite considerably 
before it can be applied to the problem.
He first confirms the point made by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 
(1975), that common property did not imply the absence of exclusion 
rights, noting that:
'Because of their basic belief in the inefficiency of collectively 
owned resources, it is economists who make themselves guilty of often 
assuming that the commons were open to everyone, and that any 
newcomer to an open field village could partake in grazing and 
tilling. Historians do not go wrong here.' (op cit., p.100)
In order to make analysis possible, some abstractions must be made 
from the wide range of variations which characterised the long history of 
the open field system. Dahlman adopts the device of a 'representative 
village' with the following features:
(i) the village consisted of a certain amount of land, divided into 
commons and arable
(ii) the arable, while in use for cropping, was privately owned and 
controlled
(iii) the non-arable land was owned collectively by the entire community
(iv) land reverted from arable to common, and back to arable, in a 
well-defined cycle.
The collective control over the common land included decisions on 
where the (privately-owned) cattle should be grazed, and the timing of 
rotation decisions. Often, it also included the hiring of a herdsman to
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take the cattle to and from the pastures. Most important of all, it 
included power to control the number of cattle each individual could 
graze, and enforced these decisions to prevent overgrazing. If this had 
not been done, the system could not have survived a thousand years, as it 
did in much of Northern Europe.
The structure by which these decisions were made is not very 
well-documented. Presumably custom played a significant role, but this 
should not be overstressed. The system required the capacity to 
adjudicate disputes, and to adapt to technological change (see below). It 
would appear that this was performed either through village meetings or 
through the manorial courts. The main legally determined requirement 
arose in connection with a decision to alienate the commons through 
enclosure. This initially required unanimous consent of the owners or 
'commoners'. Later this was changed by statute to a four-fifths majority, 
and then to three-quarters (op. cit., pp.183-84). This is a compromise 
between the problems of holdouts and the dangers of a 'rent-seeking' 
majority coalition. The other main problems with voting systems, 
discussed in Section 3.5, arose in the case of the feudal system, where 
the lord of the manor usually owned a very large holding, while many 
villagers had holdings too small to support them, and worked as hired 
labour. In view of the discussion of Section 3.5, and the absence of any 
egalitarian social welfare function in the feudal and early capitalist 
eras, it is not surprising to learn that voting was on a basis of land 
area or value, rather than equal individual votes. In a system of this 
kind, the number of villagers would not be particularly important, though 
it would be desirable that they could all meet together, rather than have 
recourse to representatives.
As was noted in Section 1.2, Dahlman refutes the idea that common 
property institutions imply open access and overuse of resources. 
Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to show why these institutions were 
preferred to available alternatives, such as enclosure, over a period of 
centuries. Dahlman demonstrates that, given increasing returns to scale 
in grazing, associated with factors such as the hiring of a common 
herdsman, common ownership will be superior to a system where the land is 
divided between a number of private owners (op.cit., pp.115-120).
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In similar situations, writers in the property rights tradition have 
frequently advocated 'internalising the externality' through a single 
private owner (Scott 1955). This would work well enough in a pure 
livestock enterprise. However, as Dahlman points out, the cropping and 
grazing aspects of the open field system were closely integrated.
Livestock grazed both the fallow land, and the stubble left after 
harvesting. In turn, their dung was used to fertilise the fields. Sole 
private ownership of a combined grazing-cropping enterprise would require 
the replacement of peasant cultivators by hired labourers, with all the 
attendant problems of shirking, monitoring costs etc. (see Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972 on these issues).
One puzzle, which has not been fully resolved, relates to the 
division of arable land into many strips, and the 'scattering' of 
individual holdings. Some scattering was required by the three field 
system of crop rotation, in order to ensure that each farmer's cropping 
area remained roughly constant over the cycle. However, the scattering of 
strips within a single field would seem to involve needless costs.
A number of hypotheses have been put forward. McCloskey (1976) 
suggests that scattering was adopted as a form of risk-reduction. Dahlman 
prefers the hypothesis that it was used to prevent individuals from 
extorting rents from the community by threatening to enclose their own 
land (op.cit. pp.121-130). I do not find this very convincing. If the 
village courts had the power to enforce scattering, why should it be 
unable to prevent a villager from unilaterally withdrawing his land from 
the common?
I would argue for an alternative hypothesis consistent with Dahlman's 
general theme - that the open field system combined as far as possible 
the benefits of size economies with those of individual proprietorship. 
Dahlman notes that cropping activities with substantial size economies, 
such as ploughing, were performed collectively, while tasks such as 
weeding, where monitoring costs are more important, were left to the 
individual proprietors. However, there must have been an intermediate 
range of tasks where mutual assistance between neighbours would have been 
valuable. The performance of such tasks on an ad hoc basis would be 
facilitated by the existence of relatively small contiguous strips. Such
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an interpretation is supported by the observation (op.cit. p.144) that 
individuals often had the same neighbours on each of their strips. This 
would aid the formation of small 'teams'.
Having shown that the open field system was not the inefficient
monstrosity so frequently portrayed, it is necessary to explain its
gradual disappearance through the process of enclosure. Apart from the
idea that the system was replaced because it was inherently inefficient
(either from a broad social viewpoint, or, in Marxian terms, with respect
to the extraction of surplus value), the most popular idea among
economists has been that the system was too inflexible to adapt to new
technology. Dahlman refutes this view, pointing out the adoption of
complex new technologies, such as water meadows and up-and-down husbandry 
21(op cit. p.166). He argues that the growth of markets, and 
improvements in transport led to a gradual process, in which specialised 
monocultural cash crops replaced the multi-activity subsistence farming, 
on which the open field system was based. We have already noted the 
efficiency of sole private ownership in the case of a pure grazing 
enterprise - this was reflected in the Tudor enclosures for wool 
production, when 'sheep ate men', and in the Highland clearances. In pure 
cropping enterprises, the case is less clear cut. Dahlman argues that, 
whereas a collectively agreed rotation scheme was essential for the 
integrated system, production for markets put a premium on individual 
flexibility.
While Dahlman's analysis is quite convincing, he tends to underplay 
the conflict inherent in this process (pp.178-84). Enclosure affected not 
only the level of income derived from a given area of land, but also its 
distribution. As was noted above, the existence of tradeable shares 
enhances the formation of rent-seeking majority coalitions. This would be 
particularly true in the case of enclosure, where the lord of the manor 
possessed not only a large holding, but control over transfers between 
landholders. This would facilitate the use of 'divide-and-conquer'
? 1x Up-and-down husbandry was a rotation scheme in which a year or two 
of cropping was followed by several years of grazing. Water meadows 
improved positive growth in winter by covering the meadow with an inch or 
two of flowing water, thereby preventing freezing.
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tactics, aimed at securing a low price for the common property rights
22which were alienated through enclosure.
Thus, Dahlman's analysis differs in some details from that which 
would follow from the theoretical approach outlined in this study. 
Nevertheless, the general agreement is very close. In particular, Dahlman 
conclusively refutes the ideas that common property implies that property 
rights are either non-existent or ill-defined, and that common property 
institutions are inherently inefficient and imply over-exploitation of 
resources.
4.3 Salinity in Australian Agriculture - The Case of 
Dryland Salting
Salinity has been a major problem in Australian agriculture for many 
years. Until recently, salinity associated with irrigation has been the 
main area of concern. Economic analysis of the problem has been caught up 
in the broader debate over issues such as dam construction and water 
pricing. Over the last ten years, a new area of concern has emerged, that 
of 'dryland* salting or saline seepage. The latter term is more precise, 
since the problem involves a buildup of salt in the catchment area of a 
given stream, and an increase in the salinity of the stream itself. The 
increase in dryland salting has been attributed mainly to the removal of 
deep-rooted tree species, and their replacement by shallow-rooted crop 
and pasture species (Greig and Devonshire, 1981).
Some of the costs of increased salinity due to tree clearance on a 
particular farm are internal to that farm, while others are borne by 
neighbours and downstream users. The proportion of costs which is borne 
privately varies widely, depending on factors such as location, and the 
sensitivity of different enterprises to salinity.
^  Work published since this chapter was written supports this 
contention. Allen (1982) uses econometric evidence to argue that the 
increases in rent following enclosures were wholly due to the 
redistribution of existing agricultural incomes from farmers to 
landlords. He also notes that the positive value of common grazing rights 
refutes those who have 'loosely argued that commons were common property 
resources and (hence) overgrazed to the extent that all rent was 
dissipated.
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In both cases, arguments derived from an externality framework have 
led to, or at least accompanied, various forms of government 
intervention. Also in both cases, private property rights solutions have 
been advocated as an alternative to intervention. The purpose of this 
section is to consider a third alternative: the adoption of common 
property institutions of the kind discussed in preceding chapters.
The case of dryland salting will be considered in the current 
section. As noted above, the main activity which affects salinity levels 
is the removal of tree cover. Greig and Devonshire use regression 
analysis to estimate this effect, and argue for a Pigouvian tax, which 
they estimate at $88 per hectare cleared. This estimate includes only the 
costs of treatment to reduce stream salinity, and not the effects of 
dryland salting.
Lumley (1982) considers both of these effects in a cost-benefit 
analysis of reafforestation in the catchment area of MacCallum's creek. 
Salinity damage here includes both dryland salting effects on farmland, 
and costs, such as damage to water-using appliances, borne by residents 
of the downstream town of Maryborough. Lumley shows that, if a discount 
rate of 7.5 per cent is used, reafforestation would yield net benefits to 
farmers as a group. At a discount rate of 10 per cent, farmers would 
lose, but the benefits to farmers and residents combined would still be 
positive. At a discount rate of 12.5 per cent, the total present value of 
the reafforestation project becomes negative.
The costs of dryland salting have been recognised by governments. 
However, the only action so far has been regulatory in form. For example, 
the Western Australian government has imposed a freeze on tree clearance 
in badly affected areas. It has also promised to compensate any farmers 
who are financially disadvantaged by its actions. This approach has been 
criticised, from a private property rights standpoint, by Hodge (1982).
He points out the well-known difficulties with intervention of this kind 
- in particular the fact that there is no mechanism to equate the 
marginal costs of preserving tree cover in different parts of the same 
catchment. In addition, Hodge argues that a freeze is inequitable, since 
it benefits those farmers who have already cleared a good deal of land.
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Hodge proposes a system of transferable clearance rights. The optimal 
proportion of tree cover would be determined by government on scientific 
and economic grounds. Each landholder would then be allotted clearance 
rights for the remaining proportion of the land. If they desired to 
retain a larger cleared area, they would have to buy clearance rights 
from their neighbours. The resulting market in rights would ensure that 
cleared land was allocated to its most valuable use.
There are a number of difficulties with Hodge's proposal. The first, 
while in some sense semantic, may have a significant effect on the 
political viability of the scheme. This is the fact that it takes the 
form of an attenuation of property rights in land, and that these rights 
can only be restored in full by potentially costly purchases of new 
rights. As Hodge points out, 'occupiers would be likely to resent the 
need to buy something which was (already) theirs.'
There are also efficiency difficulties connected with the concept of 
attenuation. As was discussed in Section 1.3, these are particularly 
severe in relation to changes in the optimal structure of property 
rights. In this case, the rights structure depends upon the optimal 
cleared area, and this cannot be known with any certainty when the 
property rights scheme is introduced. If the initial limit is too 
stringent, and is relaxed, individuals will have paid for rights some of 
which, in the upshot, are valueless. On the other hand, if it turns out 
that efficiency requires a further reduction in the cleared area, 
existing rights must either be attenuated or bought up by the State. 
Either of these solutions involves significant difficulties.
Further difficulties relate to information requirements. For example, 
it was observed above, that the viability of reafforestation depends 
crucially on the real discount rate used. The range from 7.5 per cent to 
12.5 per cent, used by Lumley, is widespread in public sector project 
analysis. However in this case most of the costs and benefits will accrue 
to farmers. In the case of farm investments, it has been argued (Quiggin 
1981) that a range of real discount rates around 5 per cent is 
appropriate. Whether or not this argument is correct, it illustrates the 
fact that there is a great deal of disagreement about this topic. It 
seems reasonable to suppose that farmers themselves would be better
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judges of the appropriate private discount rate than would a government 
23authority.
This argument is not quite so clear-cut with scientific aspects of 
the problem. It could be argued that farmers are not aware of the dangers 
posed by salinity. However, problems of this kind are normally supposed 
to justify extension and other forms of education, rather than 
paternalistic government intervention.
The common property approach provides an alternative both to the
taxes and/or regulations suggested by an externality analysis, and to
private 'activity' rights, such as those proposed by Hodge. In the case
of saline seepage, the catchment system may be treated as an asset over
which no effective property rights exist, and for which common property
rights may be created, and enforced by the State. The common owners, in
this case the group of farmers owning land in the catchment system, could
be empowered by government to levy charges on activities, such as the
maintenance of cleared land areas, which contribute to saline seepage and
thereby degrade the value of the common asset. Since the proceeds of
these levies would be distributed among the owners, the welfare of
24farmers as a group would be increased by an appropriate levy. As with 
the enforcement of other property rights, the collection of this levy 
would, ultimately, depend upon the coercive power of the state. The 
crucial question here is whether the size of the levy should be 
determined by government or by a group of common owners.
The creation of common property rights does, of course, imply some 
attenuation of pre-existing private rights. However, it makes explicit 
the reciprocity of these limitations, in a way in which a legally imposed 
redefinition of 'activity' rights does not. It would also permit a more 
flexible adaptation to changes in the state of technical knowledge about
9 1J There may, of course, by a divergence between private and social 
discount rates. If this is the case, however, a Pigouvian tax is not the 
appropriate remedy.
24 However, this will not necessarily be a Pareto-improvement. Farmers 
with a higher than average preference for cleared land, due to factors 
such as differences in enterprise mix, may lose as a result of the 
enforcement of common property rights.
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the causes and extent of salinity than would the definition of rights to 
undertake a particular activity, such as tree clearance.
It might be argued that the common property solution is, in effect, 
the same as that which would be yielded by a Pigo vian externality 
analysis. It is certainly true that, if information difficulties could be 
overcome, the optimal Pigo vian tax would be equal to the optimal levy 
imposed by a group of common owners. However, the Pigo vian theory 
suggests the imposition of a tax without compensation. As was noted in 
Section 2.2, this would improve the efficiency of resource use while 
making all of those affected worse off. Even if such a proposal were 
acceptable on equity grounds, it would certainly be unlikely to achieve 
political acceptance.2^
A Pigo vian remedy would be more appropriate in the case of the 
unilateral externality imposed by farmers on downstream water users.
While this could, in principle, be dealt with by an expanded common 
property system, there would be some significant difficulties with any 
voting system, as discussed in Chapter 3. In this case, it would seem 
simpler to apply a tax-subsidy arrangement to salinity levels generated 
by the common owners of the catchment. A subsidy may be preferred so as 
to generate an overall Pareto-improvement. It may be noted that the 
argument against subsidies for pollution reductions, put forward by 
Baumöl and Oates (1975, Ch. 12) does not apply here. The argument assumes 
that new firms will be established to take advantage of the subsidy. By 
contrast, in the common property case, the subsidy is made available to a 
given group, and its size will not be affected by changes in the 
membership of that group.
It is apparent that the costs imposed on individual landowners, 
whether through charges or through reafforestation and the maintenance of 
tree cover, will be essentially proportional to the area owned in the 
catchment. In the absence of compelling distributional arguments, this 
would appear also to be the most desirable basis for distributing the
n c The proceeds of a government-imposed tax could, of course, be 
redistributed along the lines suggested by a common property analysis. 
This reflects the difference between common property as a tool of 
analysis and as an institutional framework.
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proceeds of charges levied by the common owners. If the size of 
landholdings were roughly equal, the analysis of Section 3.5 would 
suggest that a majority voting system might be preferable. However, since 
even an initially equal distribution could be skewed by subsequent sales 
and purchases of land, it would probably be preferable to base the voting 
system, like the charges, on land area. The dangers of rent-seeking could 
be minimised by requiring regulatory approval for decisions involving an 
effective alienation of rights - e.g. a change in the basis of the 
charging system, as distinct from the rates at which charges are levied.
4.4 Salinity in Irrigation Systems
The problems of salinity in irrigation systems are bound up with the 
complex economic problems of water supply. Nevertheless, many of the 
points made in the analysis of dryland salting remain valid.
As in the dryland case, economic analysis of irrigation has followed 
two main lines of thought. The first has been based on the existence of a 
public authority with control over the construction of dams, and the 
allocation and pricing of access to water. This solution has been most 
widely adopted in practice, generally accompanied by pricing policies 
which cover little more than operating costs. Watson and Rose (1980) 
argue that this pricing pattern is characteristic of a system in a 
'development phase', and that with the completion of this phase, issues 
of equity and efficiency in pricing will become more important. A great 
deal of analysis has been devoted to the problem of determining 
appropriate pricing policies in this and related cases, taking into 
account problems such as size economies and peak-load pricing. (See, for 
example, Baumöl and Bradford 1970 and Starrett 1978. These issues are 
related to the problems discussed further here). Very few of the writers 
in this area have explicitly incorporated salinity problems into their 
analysis, though it is frequently mentioned in discussion of the problem. 
The general approach taken is, however, consistant with the imposition of 
Pigouvian taxes to deal with salinity.
An alternative approach, based on private property rights in water, 
has been advocated by writers such as Milliman (1959), Hartman and 
Seastone (1965) and Phelps et al. (1978). In our analysis, attention will
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focus on the work of Randall (1981), who provides an extensive review of 
the literature, and puts forward property-rights proposals in an 
Australian context.
Randall criticises attempts to introduce an 'efficient' pricing
structure on two grounds. The first is the information load imposed upon
the authorities, which was noted in the previous section. The second is
that an (unanticipated) change in pricing structures implies windfall
capital losses for existing water-users, whereas Randall proposes to
26consider only Pareto-improvements.
Randall proposes that, instead of setting prices for water based on 
estimates of opportunity costs, the authorities should create marketable 
rights to water. These would be entitlements to have water delivered at a 
specified time and place and at a predetermined charge. Initially, these 
rights would be distributed freely, on the basis of historical usage 
levels, so that existing water users would have their de facto property 
rights formalised. In the case of new water developments, the authorities 
would be required to earn sufficient revenue from the sale of 
entitlements and from charges for water to cover their additional costs. 
Transfers and sales of entitlements would be unrestricted, except that 
transfers involving significant alteration in the time or place of 
delivery would require the approval of the authority.
Randall also suggests that downstream water users, including 
'organised groups of conservationists', could buy rights from irrigators. 
There are, of course, significant free-rider problems here. Another, more 
fundamental, issue arises from the fact that the river is of value to 
downstream users regardless of whether dams are constructed. This 
opportunity cost is not taken into account in the financing rule imposed 
on the irrigation authority. Indeed, Niskanen's (1974) model of a 
budget-maximising bureaucracy suggests an alternative possibility. The 
authority might use funds from the sale of downstream water flows to
2fi Randall bases his requirement for Pareto improvements on Buchanan's 
(1975) contract theory. However, it is not necessary to accept this 
theory in order to see the attractions of policy schemes which will lead 
to Pareto-improvements.
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subsidise the construction of additional dams. A similar subsidy could be 
obtained from the surplus revenue yielded by infra-marginal projects.
Problems of this kind are particularly severe in relation to 
Randall's discussion of salinity. This is considered in the context of a 
discussion of the pricing of tailwater flows from one individual to 
another. Thus, the problem is considered in a 'direct interaction' 
framework, with all its attendant complexity. The property rights 
solution would require Coasian bargaining between each contiguous pair of 
water users to agree on a payment for the acceptance of saline water 
flows. Not surprisingly, Randall comes to the conclusion that 'a system 
of effluent charges may be somewhat unwieldy in operation' (op. cit. 
p.215). He suggests that the only possible solution may be ameliorative 
action by the authorities such as drainage and tube-well pumping.
There is no discussion of the incentive structure or the information 
load on the authorities here. Following on the analysis above, it may be 
noted that an expansionist Niskanen - type authority would be likely to 
ignore some aspects of the problem, such as salinity costs imposed on 
existing users by new dam constructions. Indeed, as was shown in 
Section 3.4, even a profit-maximising authority would not take adequate 
account of the cost imposed on sensitive infra-marginal water users. 
Further problems of this kind arise from Randall's proposal to maintain 
'historically acquired' rights to receive water at less than marginal 
costs. This gives the authority a clear incentive to downgrade the 
quality of water which is supplied, or at least to take no action to 
prevent such degradation.
The discussion above reveals two main problems in Randall's analysis. 
First, while individual rights to use the water flowing through the 
rivers system are defined, property rights to the underlying asset itself 
remain nebulous. The rights are not explicitly allocated to the water 
authority, but they can be captured by the construction of dams or other 
irrigation works. The second problem, arising particularly in connection 
with salinity, is that there is no mechanism to ensure that the authority 
uses such rights as it does possess in a manner which will maximise the 
value of the asset.
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These problems could be met in a common property institutional 
framework. Existing irrigators may be regarded as having acquired a 
common property right to the benefit of some portion of the river flow, 
as well as to value added by government construction of dams and other 
works. The first requirement is that the rights in the river flow be 
clearly partitioned between irrigators and downstream users. This implies 
a collective obligation on irrigators to leave a downstream flow which is 
adequate in quantity and quality. As in the case of dryland salinity, 
this could be done via a tax-subsidy arrangement.
The second, and more fundamental, implication is that irrigators 
themselves would exercise rights of control over the portion of the river 
flow to which they were entitled. One way of doing this would be to 
convert water authorities into corporations and allocate shares in the 
place of, or along with, water rights for traditional users. The 
corporation would be empowered to make decisions on pricing and supply 
levels, subject to a tax-subsidy designed to maintain downstream water 
flows.
The crucial question here is whether shares should be separable from 
the associated right to receive water deliveries. Allowing separability 
would make the transfer of property rights complete and explicit. Indeed, 
the transfer might be so explicit as to reduce its political viability 
(compare Sieper's 1982 proposal for 'butter bonds'). The main 
disadvantage would arise if ownership of the common property asset became 
effectively separated from the group of users. In this case, many of the 
problems discussed above would apply. However, it may be noted that the 
larger are these potential costs, the greater are the incentives for 
asset users to retain their shares.
4.5 Inventions, Patents and Plant Variety Rights
The area of inventions and patenting has been the subject of a good 
deal of economic analysis. One notable example is the methodological 
debate between Arrow (1962, 1969) and Demsetz (1970), referred to in 
Section 3.1, which arose out of Arrow's analysis of the factors 
determining the rate and direction of economic activity. While the costs 
and benefits of the patenting system have been the subject of a good deal
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of debate, there would appear to be a general consensus that there are 
net benefits. Recently, however, there has been vigorous debate over the 
desirability of extending patenting systems to new areas, and 
particularly over proposals for Plant Variety Rights (PVR).
The literature on inventions will not be reviewed in detail here.
(See, for example, Usher (1964), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or Tisdell 
1981). Rather, some of the main problems raised by the literature will be 
noted, and reviewed in the context of the common property approach. A 
system where the allocation of resources to invention is determined by 
the incentives of a patent system has been seen to depart from a socially 
optimal allocation of resources in three main ways.
First, the grant of a patent implies the creation of a monopoly. 
Indeed, in a historical sense, the term 'patent' refers to monopolies 
granted by governments for a variety of reasons. Patents have been used 
as a reward, not only for inventions, but for the development of new 
trade routes, or simply as a revenue-raising device. The deadweight 
monopoly loss associated with patents depends on whether the invention is 
supposed to be a new good or an improved method of producing an old one, 
and on the elasticity of demand (Tisdell 1981).
The second problem is that the inventor does not capture the full 
social benefit of the invention. This is partly because of the limited 
life of the patent, which reflects a trade-off between the desire to 
provide an adequate incentive for invention, and the desire to reduce 
monopoly cost. Patents are also limited in scope - while it may be 
possible to prevent the copying of products, it is very difficult to 
control the use of ideas. The more extensive the scope of the patent, the 
greater will be the costs of enforcement. In addition to direct costs 
such as litigation expenses, these include restrictions on independent 
research and development.
The third problem arises from the fact that a patent is granted 
exclusively to the first person to develop a particular invention. In a 
situation where the possibility of making an invention is clear, the 
marginal contribution of the person who actually succeeds is merely to 
bring the date of the invention forward somewhat. It might appear that
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this problem, which tends to imply that private returns from patents may 
be higher than the social benefits of investment, would tend to offset 
the other problems noted above. However, as will be argued below, this 
need not be the case.
This point may be developed in a common property context, which will 
permit the analysis of both the rate and direction of inventive activity. 
This contrasts with much previous partial-equilibrium analysis, which has 
analysed individual inventions, and hence has had little to say about the 
direction of inventive activity.
The basis of the common property approach is the treatment of the 
body of scientific and technical knowledge as a common property asset. 
This asset may be used without significant congestion effects, but 
exclusion from at least some consumption activities is possible. Asset 
quality may be improved by a wide range of 'inventive' activities, 
including fundamental research as well as the development of new 
technologies.
In the absence of what may be loosely called 'transactions costs', 
the first-best solution is for the common property owners to hire 
resources for inventive activity (hereafter called 'inventors') and make 
the resulting knowledge freely available. This corresponds essentially to 
government-funded research, which plays a major role especially in areas 
of 'basic' research. Indeed, if inventors' work yielded results which 
were easily predicted and monitored, this would be a first-best solution. 
However, research work is notoriously difficult to monitor, while the 
very nature of invention is that it is unpredictable. An important 
illustration of this is given by 'backyard' inventors. Many of them are 
simply cranks, but others have produced valuable ideas. It would be 
virtually impossible to screen them in advance, and hire only those of 
'genuine' merit. Even second-best solutions, such as paying a lump-sum 
for completed inventions, would involve major difficulties of this kind.
Patenting is an attempt to solve these problems by allowing inventors 
to appropriate part of the benefits of invention, by converting part of 
the common asset to private ownership. In appropriate cases, this will 
offer a closer relationship between the social and private benefits of
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invention than would a system of direct payments. From the previous 
discussion it is clear that this relationship is not exact, and that 
there are likely to be costs associated with monopoly pricing.
Of rather more interest, in the common property analysis, is the 
problem of overinvestment in areas where a profitable patent may be 
secured. In this case successful inventors benefit not only from their 
own work, but from the potential for development already inherent in the 
pool of knowledge. The invention does not come 'out of thin air' but is 
dependent on previous, more fundamental research. The grant of a patent 
allows the inventor to appropriate the benefits of this previous research 
as well as his/her own work, and means that others can no longer draw 
upon it freely. This is a classic problem of an open-access resource, 
which may be analysed in a manner analogous to that of the fishing 
example.
A simple analysis of this kind tends to suggest that an incentive to 
over-invest in invention would counteract the problems noted above. This 
would be correct if only a single form of inventive activity were 
available. The picture changes, however, when a wide range of inventive 
activities are possible. It is apparent that, where patents supply the 
only incentive, resources will be invested in different activities up to 
the point where the expected private marginal returns are equal to the 
marginal cost. Over-investment in areas of obvious potential will raise 
the marginal cost of inventive resources in other areas, and hence tend 
to reduce the level of activity there. Since inventors are being 
allocated in an inefficient fashion, this effect will tend to reduce 
rather than increase the overall rate of invention. If the total supply 
of inventors is inelastic, this effect will tend to outweigh any tendency 
to attract new resources to invention.
This point may be treated in the context of open-access resources 
generally. The argument may be put most simply by considering a resource, 
such as agricultural land, which is variable in quality. High-quality 
land is available in limited quantities, but marginal land is effectively 
a free good. Open access will imply over-intensive use of high-quality 
land. However, if the supply of resources for agriculture is inelastic, 
agricultural production may be below, rather than above, the optimal
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level. A somewhat similar model is put forward by Gould (1972), who shows 
that inefficient factor combinations may yield a sub-optimal production 
level, even though 'excessive' factor inputs are used.
The proposed introduction of PVR provides a case study of the 
problems involved in converting common to private property by means of a 
procedure such as patenting. PVR has been the subject of vigorous debate, 
both in Australia and overseas. References are given by Ockwell (1982) 
and Godden (1982).
At present, plant breeding in Australia is dominated by publicly
funded, freely disseminated research, such as that carried out by CSIRO.
Private breeding is not protected by existing patent laws, since breeding
a new plant variety is not considered to be an invention. There are,
however, some other methods by which private breeders can seek to
appropriate the benefits of their research. These include trade marks,
and in the case of sterile hybrids, trade secrets with respect to parent 
27lines.
Many of the opponents of PVR have explicitly argued that the granting 
of PVR enables the private appropriation of common property in a way in 
which the patenting of inventions do not. Such arguments have been 
criticised as 'emotional', and based on an unreasonable distinction 
between living and non-living 'inventions'. As has been argued above, all 
forms of patent involve some private appropriation of what are 
effectively common property resources, and thus the costs and benefits of 
PVR will be similar in kind to those of patenting in general. However, 
the nature of the plant breeding activity is such as to make the common 
property aspects of the problem particularly significant, and hence to 
weaken the case for the use of private property rights.
Plant breeding consists, in essence, of the sorting and recombination 
of materials already existing in the gene pool. While this is a highly 
skilled activity, it is essentially 'routine' in nature, in the sense 
that its results are sufficently easily predicted and monitored to make
27 Godden gives further details on this.
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the hiring of inventive resources a practical method of organisation.
The difficulties which bedevil the public provision of inventive activity 
are not nearly so prevalent in this case. The main scope for genuinely 
'inventive' activity in plant breeding relates to the development of new 
techniques which can then be used to develop a range of new varieties.
PVR would protect the varieties themselves, but the techniques, if not 
protected by existing patent legislation, could only be protected as 
trade secrets.
Thus, the replacement of publicly funded breeding with private 
breeding financed by PVR would be unlikely to yield substantial 
efficiency gains. On the other hand, because of the relatively 
predictable nature of the activity, the potential for misdirection of 
research resources in an attempt to secure rights in profitable areas is 
quite significant. This will depend on the nature of the particular PVR 
scheme which is introduced.
Perhaps the most important question is that of the requirements for a 
new variety to be registered. If all that is required is that the new 
variety should be different from those already registered, then the 
protection afforded by PVR is very limited. A breeder who develops a high 
yield, pest resistant variety will be faced with competition from others 
who breed in slight variations, say in colour, and register the results 
as new varieties. In effect, the breeder will be forced to rely on a 
combination of trade-mark and trade-secret protection, as at present. 
Similar difficulties would arise if the sale of unregistered varieties 
and seed mixes was permitted. It would be very difficult for a breeder to 
prove that his/her rights were being infringed by such sales. For these 
reasons, the European PVR system requires that new varieties for 
registration be submitted for 'merit testing' to demonstrate that they 
are in fact an improvement. Sales of unregistered varieties are 
prohibited.
28
O O Some areas of invention already covered by patent rights may share 
this characteristic. For example, drug companies find it profitable to 
hire, and monotor the work of, large teams of researchers. In such cases, 
publicly funded research would appear to be superior to the use of a 
patent system.
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These procedures make it possible for plant breeders to appropriate
the benefits of their own work, but they also maximise the opportunities
to appropriate previously common property and hence the incentive for
over-investment in areas of obvious profitability. For, under this
scheme, once a particular property of the pre-existing gene pool has been
29captured in a registered variety, nobody else may exploit it.
Other problems relate to enforcement costs. In Australia most seed 
for crops such as wheat is produced on-farm from the previous year's 
crop. The prohibition of this practice would involve substantial costs. 
However, if this method is used under PVR, substantial benefits could be 
captured only with very high initial prices for seed. This in turn would 
heighten the incentive for various forms of 'piracy'.
The PVR legislation under consideration at present does not involve 
merit testing, restrictions on unregistered seeds, or a prohibition of 
on-farm seed production. Hence, it is probable that Godden is correct in 
suggesting that 'The likely effects of PVR in Australia appear to have 
been overstated by both opponents and proponents of PVR (1982, p.88)'. 
However, once a limited form of PVR has been introduced, Godden notes the 
possibility that its effects may be amplified by regulatory changes such 
as those noted above. The lobbying effort devoted to the campaign for, 
and against, PVR suggests that this possibility is a very real one.
Ultimately, questions such as the desirable balance between common 
property and private property in invention and plant varieties must be 
resolved by an empirical examination of the costs and benefits. The 
common property approach provides a useful framework, within which these 
costs and benefits may be assessed.
^  Similar difficulties can, of course, arise in other areas of 
patenting. However, the fact that all plant varieties are drawn from a 
common gene pool renders these difficulties particularly 'acute'. The 
problem of determining whether or not an invention is 'genuinely novel' 
seem almost trivial in comparison.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The economic analysis of pollution and other environmental problems 
has been the subject of a vigorous and creative debate. It has given rise 
to a number of competing methodological programmes and analytical tools. 
Many of these, such as the property rights approach and the concept of 
externality, have had widespread implications for economic thought. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, this profusion of creative ideas, many 
fundamental problems within the area of environmental economics remain 
unresolved.
In this context, it may seem rash to introduce another competing 
paradigm. Nevertheless, I believe that the preceding work shows that the 
common property approach has much to offer. Its first contribution is a 
more realistic and tractable description of many actual property rights 
structures. As has been shown above, attempts to force all property 
rights into the mould of pure private rights have hampered economic 
analysis. These problems have been particularly severe when actual common 
property institutions have been analysed within a framework which treats 
'common property' and 'open access' as synonyms. Confusion between 
private and common property rights has also been evident in many areas 
where 'transactions costs' have traditionally been ascribed a major role.
In addition to the examples discussed above, a framework using common 
property as well as private property concepts would be useful in the 
analysis of institutions such as the joint-stock corporation. Both the 
orthodox theory of the shareholder-controlled firm, and the competing 
'managerialist' theories imply the existance of important common property 
elements in the institutional structure. Issues such as the role of 
voting systems are clearly of great practical importance here.
While the recognition of common property as an institutional 
framework is important, the central contribution of this thesis relates 
to the analysis of environmental problems. The development of the concept 
of common property as a basis for the analysis of 'externalities' and 
related problems almost invariably involve the use of an asset, which is 
at least potentially the subject of common property rights, and that the 
optimal usage of this asset may be determined with reference to a group
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of common owners. This insight may be formalised, as in the model of 
section 1.7, or simply used as a heuristic basis for analysis. The common 
property analysis may be used to derive policy recommendations for 
government in cases where the establishment of common property 
institutions is not feasible.
The concept of common property allows an effective move from 'direct 
interaction' to 'asset utilisation' as the basis for analysis of economic 
problems. Both the Pigo vian 'externality' approach and the Coasian 
'activity rights' approach are based on direct interaction between 
individuals, and this is responsible for many of the difficulties 
associated with these approaches. Mohring and Boyd's attempt to introduce 
an 'asset utilisation' approach foundered, largely because of their use 
of private ownership and profit maximisation as the basis of their 
analysis. This obscured the fact that maximising the profits of a private 
owner is not necessarily equivalent to maximising the value of an asset.
None of the alternative paradigms mentioned above have yielded a 
resolution of the fundamental question - when will private ownership of 
an asset lead to an optimal pattern of usage? Perhaps the most popular 
solution has been based on Baumöl and Oates' distinction between 
'depletable' and 'undepletable' externalities. As has been shown, 
however, Baumöl and Oates' approach is both internally inconsistent and 
analytically flawed. A common property analysis yields the linear damage 
condition put forward in Chapter 3 - the requirement that any consumer 
surplus should be independent of asset quality.
The analysis of the behaviour of common property institutions is a 
subject which requires a great deal more attention than has been afforded 
here. Such issues as voting systems, coalition formation and the behavior 
of custom-based institutions must all be considered in greater detail. It 
can be stated, however, that common property institutions have worked 
effectively in such diverse situations as the medieval village and the 
modern corporation, and that they may provide the best available solution 
to many environmental problems, especially those involving a high degree 
of reciprocity. The case of dryland salting, considered in Chapter 4, is 
an ideal example.
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Finally, the analysis of inventions and patents, based on the concept 
of the pool of knowledge as a common property asset, gives some idea of 
the range of possible extensions of the common property approach. I hope 
that this thesis may prove to be a worthwhile addition to the common pool.
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APPENDIX - THE TAXONOMY OF COMMON PROPERTY
The object of this Appendix is to contrast common property, as defined in 
this thesis, with alternative institutional forms.
A sharp distinction has been drawn between ’open access' and common 
property resources. As pointed out by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, an 'open 
access' situation is one where no effective property rights exist. In the 
pure open access case, there are no controls over the range of uses of the 
asset or over the intensity of asset use. This situation may occur because 
the enforcement of property rights is prohibitively expensive, as in the 
case of 'fugitive' resources'. Alternatively, resources which are 
ultimately subject to public control may be left in a condition of open 
access for a variety of reasons. By contrast, a pure common property 
situation is one where "rights of use, alienation and exclusion are held by 
a group of co-equal owners, and the way in which these rights are exercised 
is determined by a decision rule which gives all individuals equal weight".
There are a range of possible intermediate institutional forms. One which 
has received some attention arises when the group of owners can exclude 
outsiders, and control the range of permissible activities, but cannot 
directly limit usage by group members. If the number of group members is 
large, this case is essentially equivalent to open access. If the number 
is small, game-theoretic considerations come into play.
Individual usage may also be outside the control of the group because usage 
rights are rigidly fixed by law or custom. It is frequently difficult to 
distinguish this situation from a true common property situation which has 
reached a stable equilibrium usage pattern. The two cases will be 
distinguished by the response to a change in technology or prices which 
makes the existing usage pattern suboptimal for all or most group members.
In this case, true common property institutions will normally 
generate an adaptive change in usage patterns.
Alternatively, there are cases when controls over usage are applied but 
there is no exclusion, so that the group of owners is co-extensive with the 
entire community. This will generally involve state ownership, but the two 
are not logically identical. For example, the state may administer property 
even though the relevant group of users is quite limited. In some sense, 
this 'paternalist' approach is implicit in the use of regulation or 
Pigovian taxes to control local externalities. As a converse, it would be 
possible to conceive of general representative institutions, separate from 
the government proper, being established to manage particular common 
property assets. As noted in the thesis, the common property analysis may 
be used to develop management rules for publicly owned assets. However, 
space considerations preclude analysis of the associated institutional 
frameworks.
